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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“…; and that, not because he’s 
handsome, Nelly, but because 
he’s more myself than I am. 
Whatever our souls are made of, 
his and mine are the same,…” 
 
Emily Brontë, Wuthering Heights 
(p.121)  
 
 
 
 Credited with creating an intimate form of media communication, 
Oprah Winfrey is thought to be the Queen of talk show hosts. Seemingly 
effortless, she is able to get her guests to share their most private details, and 
provoke exclusive confessions (see Lance Armstrong, 2013). But why does 
Oprah reign supreme? Figure 1 might provide a first insight, showing clearly 
how Oprah imitates her guests’ posture and mannerisms during interviews. 
Whether deliberately or not, this imitation mechanism might be crucial to 
her interview skills… 
 
 
Figure 1:   Oprah at work. 
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BEING IMITATED AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
 Imitation is an important part of our everyday life; taking place 
everywhere, anytime, with anyone (Brass, Bekkering, Wöhlschlager, & 
Prinz, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). An important question, however, is why people 
tend to imitate each other? Chartrand and Bargh (1999) have shown that 
mimicry (unconscious, automatic imitation) changes the way we experience 
others. They demonstrated that we like someone who imitates us more, and 
that the interaction with this person runs more smoothly (Chameleon effect). 
Since then, a compelling range of social-psychological research has shown 
that being imitated enhances positive social behaviour towards others (e.g. 
Kühn et al., 2010; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Stel, van Baaren, & 
Vonk, 2008). van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, and van Knippenberg (2004), 
for example, have shown that subjects whose behaviour was mimicked by a 
confederate were more helpful and generous towards this mimicker. 
Moreover, they were able to demonstrate that this positive behaviour was not 
limited to the initial interaction partner but generalized to other people not 
involved in the interaction, suggesting that mimicry leads to a general 
prosocial orientation. Other studies demonstrating positive social behaviour 
as a consequence of imitation have shown that synchronization of 
movements during dyads leads to more attention for one’s interaction partner 
and a smooth information transfer (Macrae, Duffy, Miles, & Lawrence, 
2008), that consumption behaviour can be influenced by imitation (Tanner, 
Ferraro, Chartrand, Bettman, & van Baaren, 2008), that negotations are 
facilitated by strategic behavioural imitation (Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 
2008), that people with a need for affiliation tend to imitate more (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003), and that prosocial consequences of imitation are also 
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present during interactions with artificial intelligence partners (Bailenson & 
Yee, 2005). Kühn et al. (2010) suggest that positive social consequences of 
being imitated are associated with activation in regions related to reward and 
emotion (medial orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex). 
Furthermore, research by Ashton-James, van Baaren, Chartrand, Decety, and 
Karremans (2007) tried to find an answer to the question why prosocial 
effects of unconscious imitation are transferred outside of the initial dyadic 
interaction between mimicker and mimickee. They suggest that being 
imitated during social interactions leads to a shift towards interdependent 
and other-oriented self construal. According to these authors, interpersonal 
imitation enhances self perception of interdependent intimacy with non-
specified others and reduces the physical closeness to them, mediating the 
effect on positive social behaviour. Finally, Stel et al. (2008) have 
demonstrated that a similar prosocial orientation is elicited in the imitator. 
They posit that automatic imitation creates affective empathic 
representations which lead to positive social behaviour towards others, 
suggesting that affective empathy modulates the effect of imitation on 
prosocial behaviour.  
 Thus, imitative behaviour seems to be an essential process by which 
relationships between people are enhanced. This is important, since tight 
bonds between humans have been shown to have several (evolutionary) 
advantages, both on a physical and mental level (Buss & Kendrick, 1998; 
Chou, Liang, & Sareen, 2011).  
 
EMPATHY FOR PAIN 
 
In their seminal study, Singer et al. (2004) showed for the first time 
that observing someone else in pain activates pain-related brain regions in 
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the observer that are also active when directly experiencing pain (empathy 
for pain). More specifically, several studies have indicated that the affective-
motivational dimensions of pain become active when perceiving another 
person in pain (Goubert, Vervoort, & Craig, 2012; Jackson, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2005; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 2006), and that 
this effect is stronger when having an affective relationship with the person 
observed (Cheng, Chen, Lin, Chou, & Decety, 2010; Singer et al., 2004). 
However, although a meta-analysis by Lamm et al. (2011) suggests that the 
anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are most 
consistently activated during empathy for pain, research has shown that the 
sensory dimension of pain becomes active as well (Bufalari, Aprile, 
Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007; Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, & Decety, 
2008; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007; Loggia, Mogil, & 
Bushnell, 2008; for a review see Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). 
Furthermore, Singer et al. (2004) suggest that these reactions serve an 
important function since they are the basis for our ability to form subjective 
representations of others’ feelings, allowing us to understand the emotional 
value of stimuli for others and predict the consequences. Since being 
imitated has been demonstrated to have several positive social consequences, 
we wanted to investigate whether it also influences observing another person 
in pain. Several studies have already indicated that empathy for pain can be 
modulated by both cognitive top-down (e.g. Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, 
Echols, & Corell, 2009; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 
2008; Lamm, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2010; Singer et al., 2006), and bottom-up 
features (e.g. Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009; Yang, 
Decety, Lee, Chen, & Cheng, 2009). The influence of being imitated on 
empathy for pain, however, had never been the subject of research.  
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The aim of the current thesis was thus to investigate whether being 
imitated can modulate responses to observing someone else in pain. Since 
being imitated increases prosocial behaviour (e.g. Kühn et al., 2010; Lakin et 
al., 2008; van Baaren et al., 2004), it seems intuitive that it would increase 
reactions to observing others in pain. Furthermore, we wanted to investigate 
which mechanism(s) combine(s) both research domains, by examining 
which process mediates the interaction of motor imitation on empathy for 
pain. More specifically, we aimed to explore whether a shared 
representational account could be used to explain the effect of being imitated 
on empathy for pain, since both have been separately linked to this idea 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005; Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Heberlein & 
Atkinson, 2009). Thus, we predicted that being imitated would increase self-
other confusion due to a common coding of own and others’ actions (e.g. 
Brass, Derrfuss, Cramon, & von Cramon, 2003; Liepelt, von Cramon, & 
Brass, 2008), enhancing reactions to observing someone else in pain.  
In order to investigate whether being imitated has an influence on 
empathy for pain, we developed a paradigm that combined literature on 
being imitated and empathy for pain. In this paradigm, individuals sit in 
front of a computer screen placing their right hand on a custom-built 
response box that is able to detect lifting movements. Simultaneously, a right 
hand on screen is observed, in exactly the same position. The task for 
subjects is then to randomly and voluntarily lift one of four fingers, namely 
the index, middle, ring, or little finger. Subsequently, the hand on screen 
either immediately imitates these movements (being imitated condition) or 
not (not being imitated condition). After approximately 20 of these 
movements (all imitation or all non-imitation), the hand on screen receives 
painful stimulation. For this purpose, we had professionals develop ten 
different movies in which it is observed how painful stimulation is applied to 
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a right hand (‘bore goes into the hand’, ‘hammer is smacked on the hand’, 
‘hot iron is pressed on the hand’, ‘knife cuts the hand’, ‘nail is knocked into 
the hand’, ‘nail of the ring finger is pulled out of the hand’, ‘paper makes a 
paper cut in the hand’, ‘pincers pinches the hand’, ‘sandpaper is rubbed 
over the hand’, ‘stapler puts a staple into the hand’; see Figure 2 for an 
example). During and after these pain movies, it was possible to measure 
reactions to observing the painful stimulation and we could verify whether 
these reactions were stronger after being imitated compared to not being 
imitated.  
 
 
Figure 2:   Picture of the bore pain movie, in which a bore goes into the back 
of the hand. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
In a series of studies, we applied this paradigm to explore the 
hypothesis that being imitated increases empathy for pain. In a first 
behavioural study, we used self-reports and psychophysiological responses 
to look at reactions when observing a hand in pain. This study established 
our paradigm as a valuable tool to investigate our research question, and 
provided first evidence for the idea that being imitated influences empathy 
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for pain due to increased self-other overlap. In a second study, we measured 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) via transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS), exploring whether being imitated also affects action tendencies when 
observing someone else in pain. Third, in a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study, we were able to look directly at brain activation 
during pain perception, comparing conditions in which participants were 
being imitated or not. Finally, we performed a patient study with adults with 
high functioning autism (HFA) using the paradigm to compare the 
modulation of empathy for pain by being imitated in adults with HFA and 
typically developing (TD) adults.  
In Chapter 2, we describe a study in which we used the 
aforementioned paradigm to investigate whether being imitated leads to 
higher empathy for pain. Since it was important to explore the validity of the 
paradigm, we focused on explicit and implicit indirect measures of empathy 
for pain. First, we used a self-report measure after each pain movie, 
questioning subjects’ feelings regarding the other person’s pain and own 
experienced pain, combined with unpleasantness (affective) and intensity 
(sensory) judgements. In addition, we measured psychophysiological 
responses such as the startle blink reflex, skin conductance, and heart rate 
changes. All measures were seen as indices of autonomic functioning that 
have been shown to be responsive to negative emotional stimuli (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Vrana, Spence, & Lang, 1988). In a first 
experiment, we aimed to investigate whether being imitated increases 
affective responses to seeing someone else in pain using both explicit and 
implicit responses. Furthermore, in a second experiment, we wanted to 
explore whether self-other confusion modulated the effect. By creating a 
spatial variation of the above described paradigm (tilting the screen and 
placing participants’ hand under it, hidden from their own view), we linked 
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our setup to rubber hand illusion paradigms, in which subjects feel 
ownership over a rubber hand when viewing this rubber hand being stroked 
simultaneously with their own hidden hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). 
Since this illusion is also thought to reflect sharing of representations 
between self and other (e.g. Tajadura-Jiminez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012), this 
second experiment allowed us to explore self-other overlap as an underlying 
mechanism. Thus, in this study, we aimed to look at the effect of being 
imitated on affective responses (both explicit and implicit) when observing 
someone else in pain in two experiments, and verify whether sharing of 
representations between self and other is (at least in part) responsible for this 
effect. Furthermore, these experiments allowed us to investigate the 
suitability and validity of our newly developed paradigm for the first time. 
 In Chapter 3, a study is described in which we performed TMS to 
look at MEPs of the first dorsal interroseus of the right hand when observing 
the hand on screen in pain. Using this method, we were able to explore 
whether action tendencies were affected by our imitation manipulation, 
providing us with compelling evidence that being imitated influences bodily 
reactions when observing pain, and supporting the idea that such a 
manipulation is strongly reflected upon the self. The primary aim of the 
study, however, arose from a discrepancy in the literature. Several TMS 
studies have shown that the observation of painful stimulation delivered to 
the hand of a human model induces a decrease in corticospinal excitability 
(CSE) in the hand of the observer (e.g. Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 
2005; Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006). However, other 
findings indicate that is decrease is not universal. It has been shown that this 
inhibition is reduced in individuals with high levels of trait-personal distress 
(Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2009) and that pain 
synesthetes (i.e. individuals who experience actual pain when observing 
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injury to another) show a significant increase in CSE while observing pain in 
others (Fitzgibbon et al., 2012). In this experiment, we wanted to investigate 
whether the nature of these CSE modulations are dependent upon the control 
subjects exert over the observed hand in pain. This TMS study was crucial to 
gain insight into contradicting findings in the literature concerning reactions 
of the motor system when observing others in pain. Furthermore, we wanted 
to explore whether our imitation manipulation was powerful enough to 
modulate action tendencies.  
 In Chapter 4, we present an fMRI study that was conducted to 
investigate directly whether being imitated increases pain-related brain 
activation in the observer when observing someone else in pain. Specifically, 
this study allowed us to explore which part of the pain matrix is modulated 
by the imitation manipulation. Since a meta-analysis of Lamm et al. (2011) 
has shown that the AI and ACC are most consistently activated during 
empathy for pain, we expected heightened activity to be concentrated in 
these regions. Second, it was possible to examine whether self-other overlap 
mediates the effect of being imitated on empathy for pain by investigating 
whether brain regions associated with self-other distinction (e.g. temporo-
parietal junction; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & 
Brass, 2010) were modulated by the imitation manipulation. Thus, this fMRI 
study allowed us to investigate whether being imitated increases pain-related 
brain activation when observing someone else in pain. Furthermore, activity 
in regions related to self-other distinction provided neural support for the 
idea that increased self-other merging mediates this influence. 
 In Chapter 5, we applied the paradigm to adults with autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), more specifically HFA. ASD is a pervasive 
neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by abnormalities in social 
communication and interaction and restricted and repetitive patterns of 
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behaviour, interests, or activities (DSM-5, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  In addition, a large number of studies suggest 
deficiencies in imitation and empathy abilities. However, the nature of these 
abnormalities is a hot topic of debate. While imitation was initially thought 
to be reduced in ASD (for a review see Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004), 
more recent studies have contradicted these findings (see for example 
Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010 for hyperimitation). Second, empathy has 
been argued to be deficient in adults with ASD as well (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004). However, while early research indicated an absence or 
reduction of empathic responses in ASD (e.g. Minio-Paluello, Baron-Cohen, 
Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009), more recent research suggests otherwise 
(e.g. Hadjikhani et al., 2014). With the current paradigm (using the explicit 
and implicit measures used in the Chapter 2), we were able to further 
investigate whether people with ASD have problems in being imitated and 
empathy, and test whether this influence of being imitated on empathy for 
pain in adults with HFA is similar or different from that of TD adults. This 
final empirical study provided us with crucial insights into the empathic 
abilities of ASD, and the influence of being imitated on these empathic 
responses.   
 Finally, in the General Discussion, we summarize across all chapters 
and give an overview of strengths and limitations of the current thesis, and 
provide directions for future research.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
I SUFFER MORE FROM YOUR PAIN WHEN YOU ACT LIKE 
ME:  BEING IMITATED ENHANCES AFFECTIVE RESPONSES 
TO SEEING SOMEONE ELSE IN PAIN
1
 
Social-psychological research suggests that being imitated changes the way we 
experience others. We like someone who imitates us more, and the interaction 
with this person runs more smoothly. Whether being imitated also affects basic 
social reactions such as empathy for pain is an open question. Empathy for pain 
refers to the observation that perceiving another person in pain results in pain-
related brain activation in the observer. The aim of the present study was to 
combine both lines of research, and investigate whether being imitated can 
influence empathy for pain. To this end, we developed an experimental 
approach combining an imitation task with a pain perception task. Subjective 
reports as well as physiological responses indicated that being imitated 
enhances affective responses to seeing someone else in pain. Furthermore, 
using rubber hand illusion measures, we provide evidence for the role of shared 
representations in the sensory and motor domain as a core underlying 
mechanism. In this way, our study integrates social-psychological research on 
being imitated with cognitive research on empathy for pain. This has broad 
implications, since imitation plays a crucial role in our daily social 
interactions, and our study provides insights into a basic cognitive mechanism 
that might underlie these social situations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imitation is an important part of our behavioural repertoire. It 
sometimes occurs automatically, without intention, and even between complete 
strangers (Brass, Bekkering, Wöhlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, & 
Prinz, 2001; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Moreover, an extensive body of social-
psychological research has shown that imitation is very important for our social 
life, by changing the way we experience others. Research on the so-called 
Chameleon effect suggests that we like someone who imitates us more, and that 
the interaction with this person runs more smoothly (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Furthermore, several experiments indicate that being imitated enhances 
prosocial orientation (positive social behaviour towards others; Lakin, 
Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Stel, van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008; Kühn et al., 2010).  
While the positive consequences of being imitated have been 
demonstrated for relatively complex social behaviour such as liking and 
prosocial actions, the question arises whether being imitated also influences 
more automatic and implicit social processes such as reacting to someone else 
being in pain. Several studies demonstrate that perceiving another person in 
pain activates brain regions involved in the affective-motivational dimensions 
of pain (Goubert, Vervoort, & Craig, in press; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
2005; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 2006), especially when 
having an affective relationship with the person observed (Cheng, Chen, Lin, 
Chou, & Decety, 2010; Singer et al., 2004). This finding, called empathy for 
pain, shows that the observation of pain activates pain-related brain regions in 
the observer that are also active when directly experiencing pain. Thus, it 
indicates that first person experience of pain and the observation of pain in 
others are based on shared neural circuits, with growing evidence for both 
affective and sensory sharing in empathy for pain responses (Bufalari, Aprile, 
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Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007; Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, & Decety, 2008; 
Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007; Loggia, Mogil, & Bushnell, 2008; 
for a review see Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). Several studies have 
indicated that this sharing of representations when observing someone else in 
pain can be influenced by a wide range of cognitive mechanisms and is thus 
modulated by top-down processing (e.g. Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, Echols, & 
Corell, 2009; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 2008; Lamm, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2010; Singer et al., 2006). Furthermore, it has been shown 
that features such as race (Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009) and gender (Han, Fan, 
& Mao, 2008; Yang, Decety, Lee, Chen, & Cheng, 2009) of the person in pain 
play a crucial role. Decety and Lamm (2006) therefore suggest a model in 
which the empathic response can be seen as the intertwined influence of both 
bottom-up and top-down factors.  
 The aim of our first experiment was to investigate whether being imitated 
can also influence affective responses to seeing someone else in pain. In 
particular, we wanted to investigate whether the functional system that is 
involved in motor imitation interacts with the system that mediates empathy for 
pain, and explore the underlying mechanisms. While both systems are related to 
different neural structures (e.g. Grezes & Decety, 2001; Singer et al., 2004), 
they are based on a similar functional mechanism. Being imitated, as well as 
empathy for pain, have been related to shared representations of self and other 
(Brass & Heyes, 2005; Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Heberlein & 
Atkinson, 2009). Furthermore, the Chameleon effect has already been linked to 
empathy (the ability to share the affective experiences of others; Singer & 
Lamm, 2009), and an underlying shared representational system has been 
proposed here as well (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). We predicted that being 
imitated would increase empathy for pain compared to not being imitated. To 
test this hypothesis, we developed an experimental approach combining a 
32     CHAPTER 2 
simple imitation task (participants performed finger lifting movements that were 
imitated by a hand on screen or not) with a pain perception task (painful 
stimulation was applied to the hand on screen), and investigated whether 
measures of empathy for pain were higher in the imitative condition. To 
measure whether being imitated would lead to higher empathy for pain, we 
focused on explicit and implicit responses. First, we used a self-report measure 
after each pain movie. In addition, since Preston and de Waal (2002) argue that 
the activation of brain representations can result in somatic and autonomic 
responses, we tested whether physiological responding was affected. Thus, as a 
somatic response, we measured the startle blink reflex with electromyography 
(EMG), a blink reflex of the eye that is part of an automatic reaction to sudden, 
intense stimuli (Miller, Patrick, & Levenston, 2002). It has been shown that the 
amplitude of this blink reflex varies according to changes in affective value, 
with larger amplitudes for negative and smaller amplitudes for positive 
compared to neutral situations respectively (Vrana, Spence, & Lang, 1988). If 
being imitated would lead to higher empathy for pain, we expected the startle 
blink amplitude to be larger in this condition since observing somebody in pain 
has a negative affective value.  
 Furthermore, in a second experiment, we aimed to explore the underlying 
mechanism(s) in more depth, using a spatial variation of the above described 
paradigm. More specifically, we wanted to investigate whether self-other 
confusion might underlie the observed effects, by developing a setup in which 
this confusion was thought to be enhanced. If self-other confusion modulates 
the influence of being imitated on empathy for pain, we expected this new setup 
(specifically aimed at eliciting stronger confusion) to increase this influence. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
 Participants. Twenty right-handed volunteers (Mage = 19.61, SD = 1.56) 
participated in the study, all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. To 
control for possible sex differences (e.g. Han et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2009), 
only female volunteers were recruited. They were given course credits in 
exchange for participation, and provided written consent at the beginning of the 
experiment. The study was granted ethical approval by the local ethics 
committee.  
 Experimental design. Blocks of trials consisted of two phases: an action 
phase in which movements of the subjects were imitated (imitation block) or 
not (non-imitation block), and a pain perception phase which immediately 
followed the action phase. In the pain perception phase, one of nine pain movies 
was presented (see Table 1).  Each pain movie was combined two times with 
both an imitation and non-imitation block, presenting a startle probe during the 
pain movies to elicit the startle blink reflex once after each type of block. As 
such, the experiment consisted of 36 trials in the experiment: each of the nine 
pain movies was combined with both imitative (imitation and non-imitation) 
and both startle (startle and no startle) conditions. The content of the pain 
movie, the block condition, and the startle condition were completely 
randomized. 
 Stimuli and apparatus. Stimulus material consisted of three types of 
720 x 576 video-clips created by professionals: a hand in a resting position, 
simple finger movements (for the action phase of the task), and pain videos 
showing a hand receiving pain stimulation (for the pain perception phase). 
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 In the resting state video clip, a right hand with palm down and fingers 
slightly spread was shown, equal to the position of the right hand of participants 
placed on the response box. This video remained on screen in between 
presentation of the other videos in order to assure continuous observation of a 
right hand on screen.   
 During the action phase of the experimental task, participants carried out 
simple finger movements of the index, middle, ring, or little finger. These finger 
movements were recorded with a custom-built response device using light 
sensors. This device allowed us to use finger lifting movements of participants 
as triggers for the presentation of the appropriate finger movement video. As 
such, participants immediately observed finger movements of the video-taped 
hand on screen in response to their own lifting movements. For example, in an 
imitative block, the lifting of an index finger resulted in the presentation of the 
index finger lifting video, while the middle, ring, or little finger lifting video 
was shown in a non-imitative block. All finger movement clips had a total 
duration of 2000 ms. 
 Finally, nine pain movies in which painful stimulation was applied to the 
hand on screen were recorded for the pain perception part of the task (all with a 
total duration of 8000 ms; see Table 1). 
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Table 1: Description of the different pain movies used in the experiment.  
 
Movie Description 
Bore Bore goes into the hand 
Hammer Hammer is smacked on the hand 
Iron Hot iron is pressed on the hand 
Nail Nail is knocked into the hand with a hammer 
Nail out Nail of the ring finger is pulled out of the hand 
Paper cut Paper makes a paper cut in the hand 
Pincers Pincers pinch the hand 
Sandpaper Sandpaper is rubbed over the hand 
Stapler Stapler puts a staple into the hand 
 
 Self-report measures. During the experiment, four behavioural questions 
were presented after each pain movie, to measure explicit reactions to observing 
the hand in pain: ‘How unpleasant do you think the other person found the pain 
stimulation?’, ‘How intense do you think the other person experienced painful 
sensations?’, ‘How unpleasant did you find the pain stimulation yourself?’, 
‘How intense did you experience painful sensations yourself?’. The first two 
questions refer to painful experiences of the other person, while the last two 
questions refer to first person experiences. Both affective (unpleasantness) and 
sensory (intensity) dimensions of pain had to be rated on a scale from -5 (not 
unpleasant/intense at all) to +5 (very unpleasant/intense), since research 
suggests that both dimensions might be activated when observing someone else 
in pain (Bufalari et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2008; Lamm et al., 2007; Loggia et 
al., 2008; Keysers et al., 2010). 
 After the experiment, participants filled in the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; for Dutch translation see De Corte et al., 2007) as a 
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measure of dispositional trait empathy. This questionnaire consists of 28 items 
which have to be rated on a 5-point Likert scale, and can be divided into four 
subscales: Perspective Taking, Empathic Concern, Fantasy, and Personal 
Distress. Internal consistency and construct validity of the Dutch translation 
suggest that the IRI is a valuable tool to measure self-report empathic 
tendencies (De Corte et al., 2007). Cronbach’s α in the current study for 
Perspective taking was .62, for Empathic Concern .61, for Fantasy .80, and for 
Personal Distress .80.  
 Procedure. Participants were seated in front of a standard computer 
screen at arm length, and asked to place the four fingers of their right hand on a 
custom-made response box. As soon as the video-taped right hand appeared on 
screen (resting state movie), subjects were instructed to voluntary and randomly 
lift one of their four fingers that was placed on the response box. Immediately 
after movement of one of the subjects’ fingers (delay = 0 ms, estimate of 
intrinsic delay of computer/software = 66.93 ms), a movie was shown in which 
the hand on screen performed the same or a different movement for imitation 
and non-imitation blocks respectively (see Figure 1). After twenty of such 
movements (all imitative or all non-imitative), one of the pain movies in which 
the hand on screen receives painful stimulation was immediately presented. 
After this pain movie, four behavioural questions appeared on screen, which 
had to be rated on a scale from -5 to +5. 
 During the pain clips, a burst of white noise of  95 dB(A) was presented 
after 4000 ms via headphones in only 50 % of the cases in order to avoid 
predictability of the occurrence of this startle probe (Hawk & Cook, 2000). 
Prior to the start of the experiment, the startle noise was presented successively 
five times, in order to control for initial habituation. 
Before the start of the experiment, two practice blocks (one of each 
imitative condition) were presented in order to familiarize subjects with the 
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procedure. The pain movie shown in these practice blocks was not used in the 
experimental phase. Furthermore, in these practice blocks, it was verified 
whether participants understood the behavioural questions correctly. More 
specifically, they were explicitly made aware of the distinction between other- 
and self-related questions, and of the fact that the question ‘How intense did you 
experience painful sensations yourself?’ related to self-experienced painful 
sensations alone. Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants filled in the 
IRI as a measure of trait empathy.    
 
 
Figure 1: Example of an imitation block in which the participants chooses to lift his/her 
index finger as a first movement (action phase) and the hammer pain video is shown 
after 20 movements (pain perception phase). 
 
 Electrophysiological recording and analyses. Psychophysiological 
signals were registered with a Biopac MP150 System and digitalized using 
AC1001 – AcqKnowledge Software for Windows with Electronic Manual 
(Biopac Systems, Inc.).  
 Startle blink reflex. The startle eye blink reflex was measured according 
to Blumenthal et al.’s guidelines (2005). Two small Ag/AgCL electrodes (5 
mm) were placed over the orbicularis oculi muscle of the left eye, while a 
ground electrode was placed in the middle of the forehead. The raw EMG signal 
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was amplified with a gain of 5000, filtered with a hardware band pass filter of 
0.5 – 500 Hz, and digitally sampled at 1000 Hz, later offline rectified and 
integrated with PSPHA (De Clercq, Verschuere, De Vlieger, & Crombez, 
2006). The magnitude of the eye blink amplitude was computed as the 
subtraction of the mean rectified baseline value (0 – 20 ms after probe onset) 
from the rectified peak value in the 21 – 120 ms interval after probe onset. 
Trials on which baseline values deviated more than 2.5 SD from the mean 
baseline value of the subject were visually inspected, and if necessary (e.g., 
movement artefacts, blink onset before probe onset), eliminated (11.74 %). 
Finally, reflex magnitudes were converted to T-scores across trials on a within-
participant basis to adjust for between-participant differences in response and 
baseline EMG magnitude (Funayama, Grillon, Davis, & Phelps, 2001) as 
follows: z-score value = (raw magnitude value – M all raw values)/SD all raw 
values; T-score value = (z-score value x 10) + 50. Z-score values were trimmed 
(all scores below -3 and above +3 were put at -3 and +3 respectively) before 
they were converted to T-scores.  
 Additional measures of the autonomous nervous system (ANS). We 
measured two additional implicit measures, namely skin conductance and heart 
rate changes, both indices of autonomic functioning that have been shown to be 
responsive to negative emotional stimuli (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
2001). 
 Skin conductance was measured using a constant voltage (0.5 V) and two 
Ag/AgCL electrodes with a diameter of 8 mm. The electrodes were filled with 
conductive gel and were attached on the thenar and hypothenar eminences of 
the left hand. Skin conductance was digitized at 10 Hz for the entire duration of 
the pain movie (8000 ms). Using PSPHA, skin conductance responses were 
calculated as the difference between the highest and the lowest value in this 
8000 ms time window. In order to normalise the data, skin conductance 
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amplitudes were square root transformed prior to analysis (Dawson, Schell, & 
Fillion, 2000).  
 Finally, heart rate was measured using three Ag/AgCL electrodes with a 
diameter of 8 mm filled with conductive gel and placed in lead II configuration 
(by attaching electrodes to both legs and the right arm, heart rate is measures as 
the voltage drop from left leg to right arm). The heart rate was filtered (band 
pass: 0 – 40 Hz) and digitized at 500 Hz. For heart rate changes, PSPHA was 
used to detect R-peaks, to calculate the distance between them (inter beta 
interval; IBI), and to correct for artefacts. Prior to analysis, the IBI was 
converted to heart rate in beats per minute (bpm) per real-time epoch (1000 ms). 
Mean bpm in the first 1000 ms of the video clip was compared to the mean bpm 
of the following 7000 ms, by calculating mean heart rate change (i.e. mean heart 
rate last 7000 ms – mean heart rate first 1000 ms). 
Results 
 A .05 significance level was used in all statistical tests. Due to equipment 
failure, physiological recording was limited to 15 subjects for all physiological 
measures.  
        Subjective reports. All four questions followed the expected pattern, 
resulting in higher scores after imitation compared to non-imitation blocks (see 
Table 2). A 2 (Condition: Imitation versus Non-imitation) x 4 (Item: 1 - 4) 
repeated measures analysis, however, showed a significant Condition by Item 
interaction, F(3,17) = 3.75, p < .05. Planned comparisons indicated that 
conditions differed only for the affective-other and self-sensory questions, t(19) 
=  2.21, p < .05, d = .40 and t(19) = 3.25, p < .01, d = .44 respectively, but not 
for the other two questions (both ps > .05).  
 
 
 
40     CHAPTER 2 
Table 2: Four behavioural questions, the aspect of empathy for pain they refer 
to, and their corresponding mean scores (standard deviations) in the different 
conditions (range from -5 to +5). 
 
Question Aspect Imitation Non-
imitation 
‘How unpleasant do you think 
the other person found the pain 
stimulation?’ 
Other – affective 4.30 (.49) 4.18 (.61) 
‘How intense do you think the 
other person experienced 
painful sensations?’ 
Other – sensory 4.15 (.59) 4.07 (.65) 
‘How unpleasant did you find 
the pain stimulation yourself?’ 
Self – affective 2.02 (2.42) 1.86 (2.30) 
‘How intense did you 
experience painful sensations 
yourself?’ 
Self – sensory .17 (2.87) -.47 (2.85) 
 
Blink modulation and ANS activity. A paired t-test revealed a 
significant difference in startle magnitude between the imitation and non-
imitation condition: t(14) = 3.41, p < .01, d = 3.35; with higher scores after 
imitation compared to non-imitation blocks (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Mean blink magnitude in the imitation and non-imitation condition in the first 
experiment. Magnitude is expressed as within subjects T-scores, error bars are standard 
errors of the mean. 
 
Interestingly, there were no significant correlations between 
behavioural and physiological data, nor were there any significant correlations 
with subjects’ scores on the sub-scales of the IRI. Furthermore, IRI scale scores 
were added as covariates in all analyses to investigate the moderating effect of 
dispositional empathic tendencies. Interactions with these sub-scores were again 
not significant for both explicit and implicit responses (all ps > .05). 
In contrast to the startle blink reflex, skin conductance and heart rate 
changes were not sensitive to the imitation manipulation (ps >.05). This was not 
completely surprising, however, given that the startle blink reflex amplitude has 
been shown to be most sensitive to changes in valence (Bradley, 2009).        
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Discussion 
The aim of this first experiment was to investigate whether being 
imitated has an influence on the way we react to perceiving pain in others. 
Using behavioural and physiological measures, the present study provides 
evidence for the hypothesis that being imitated leads to higher affective 
responses when observing pain. On the behavioural level, participants judged 
that the other person experienced the pain stimulation as more unpleasant and 
that they experienced more intense painful sensations themselves after being 
imitated. Furthermore, the startle blink magnitude was significantly larger when 
viewing the pain movie after being imitated, indicating that higher negative 
affect was elicited in this condition. This indicates a stronger pain-related 
response after being imitated compared to not being imitated. Since Preston and 
de Waal (2002) argue that observing pain can lead to associated physiological 
responses as an index of higher activation in pain-related brain areas, and since 
the startle reflex has previously been related to empathy for pain (Caes et al., 
2012), we believe that our results provide evidence for the idea that being 
imitated increases empathy for pain. 
The question remains, however, which mechanism(s) could underlie the 
increase of empathy for pain when being imitated. First, social-psychological 
research suggests that being imitated leads to enhanced liking for the other 
person (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). This increased liking could in turn lead to 
higher empathy for pain, since it has been shown that reactions to observing 
another person in pain are stronger when we have an affective relationship with 
the person observed (Cheng et al., 2010; Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, Batson, & 
Singer, 2010). A second mechanism, however, is strongly based on the idea of 
shared representations, and suggests that the underlying process combining 
imitation and observational pain research is more basic in nature. As suggested 
above, both motor imitation and empathy for pain rely on shared representations 
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of self and other, possibly eliciting a self-other confusion mechanism (e.g. 
Brass, Derrfuss, Cramon, & von Cramon, 2003; Liepelt, von Cramon, & Brass, 
2008). In the imitative condition, this confusion is thought to be elicited, since 
the same actions are performed and these actions are commonly coded. 
Furthermore, when representations of self and other become difficult to 
distinguish, pain applied to the other person should have a stronger influence on 
your own bodily reactions. Note that the current setup (using no delay between 
executed and observed movement and a first person perspective) increased the 
likelihood that this self-other confusion mechanism would take place. However, 
since significant effects on the ratings were observed for items suggesting both 
an abstract empathy process (affective-other question) and self-other confusion 
(sensory-self question), it is difficult to distinguish between both accounts based 
on the present results. Furthermore, the absence of correlations between 
subjective reports and implicit responses suggests that multiple mechanisms 
may be at work, although our relatively small sample size might be responsible 
for the absence of correlations in this experiment as well. The finding that being 
imitated changed empathy for pain on a trial by trial basis, however, is more in 
accordance with a self-other confusion interpretation rather than a trial by trial 
change in liking.  
Hence, to further investigate the possible influence of an underlying 
self-other confusion mechanism based on shared representations between self 
and other, we conducted a second experiment in which we aimed to explore this 
process in more depth, and gain better insight into the effects observed in the 
first experiment. The general logic of the second experiment was thus to link 
observed effects of the first experiment to processes related to confusion 
between self and other, and investigate whether the strength of empathy for pain 
would be affected by increasing this self-other overlap. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 In the second experiment, we aimed to replicate as well as extend the 
findings of the first study. To do so, we linked our setup to rubber hand illusion 
(RHI) paradigms, in which subjects feel ownership over a rubber hand when 
viewing this rubber hand being stroked simultaneously with their own hidden 
hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). This illusion, commonly observed with a 
sensory manipulation, is also thought to reflect sharing of representations 
between self and other (e.g. Tajadura-Jiminez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012). First, 
we wanted to investigate whether the setup we have used in Experiment 1 with 
the hand being presented on a computer screen positioned in front of 
participants elicits a stronger RHI in the imitative compared to the non-imitative 
condition (see Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009 for a similar 
action-induced RHI). Second, we also wanted to explore whether we could 
create a setup which would increase self-other confusion by manipulating the 
spatial position of the observed hand. Hence, we varied our original setup as 
explained in Experiment 1 by tilting the screen on which the videotaped right 
hand was presented and placing participants’ own right hand under it, covering 
the latter and thus making it invisible (in contrast to the first setup where the 
screen was placed in front of participants). Since these adjustments were 
thought to elicit a stronger RHI (as do similar manipulations with a sensory 
RHI; Lloyd, 2007) and thus enhance confusion between self and other, we 
expected effects of being imitated on empathy for pain to be stronger in this 
newly developed setup compared to the original one. This way, we wanted to 
investigate whether self-other confusion might (in part) be responsible for the 
observed effects. 
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Method 
 Participants. Twenty-one right-handed volunteers (Mage = 21.38, SD = 
2.36) participated in this second study, all with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. To control for possible sex differences, only female volunteers were 
recruited. They were given 10 Euros for participation, and provided written 
consent at the beginning of the experiment. The study was granted ethical 
approval by the local ethics committee.  
 Experimental design. The second experiment consisted of two parts in a 
within-subjects design. In one part, participants performed the task with a setup 
equal to that of the first experiment (setup where hand of participant lies in front 
of the screen: “front” position setup), while a slightly different setup was used 
in the other part of the experiment (setup where hand of participant lies under 
the screen: “under” position setup). The order of these parts was 
counterbalanced across participants: odd subjects started with the front position 
setup, while even subjects started with the under position setup. Furthermore, an 
additional movie was used in this study (‘knife’: knife cuts the hand). This way, 
ten movies were available, of which two times five different movies were 
randomly allocated to one of both setups for all participants. Since the 
experimental design was equal to that of the first experiment in both parts, each 
part consisted of 20 trials (five pain movies combined with two imitative and 
two startle conditions).   
 Stimuli and apparatus. The video material was equal to that of the first 
experiment, with the addition of a tenth pain movie (knife movie, see above).  
 Participants performed the task as explained in Experiment 1 under two 
setups with a different spatial position: hand in front of and under the screen. In 
the front position setup, the screen on which all stimuli material was presented 
was placed in front of participants. This way, participants’ own hand was still 
visible. In the under position setup, on the other hand, the same screen was 
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tilted horizontally, and participants were asked to place their hand under the 
screen. To ensure that subjects could only see the hand on screen, a towel was 
attached to the screen, covering their own hand.  
 Self-report measures. In contrast to the first experiment, 11 explicit 
questions were presented after each pain movie, in order to get a better 
understanding of possible underlying self-other confusion and RHI processes. 
The first three questions, to be rated on a scale from -5 to +5 were used to 
examine whether a RHI was elicited, questioning three different aspects of this 
illusion (Longo, Schuur, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008; Tsakiris, 
Longo, & Haggard, 2010): ‘It felt as if I could control the hand on screen’ 
(agency), ‘It felt as if my own hand was at the location of the hand on screen’ 
(location), ‘It felt as if the hand on screen was my own hand’ (ownership). 
Furthermore, a fourth question, referring to empathy for pain, had to be 
answered: ‘I felt pain on my own hand when I saw the hand on screen being 
injured’.  Finally, a Dutch translation of the scale of Batson, Fultz, and 
Schoenrade (1987) was used, presenting seven items measuring two types of 
emotional responses. These items questioned the subjective feelings of 
participants while viewing painful stimulation, with four items referring to self-
oriented feelings (personal distress; ‘While viewing the painful stimulation of 
the other person I felt worried/distressed/anxious/sad’), and three items 
referring to other-oriented feelings (concern; ‘While viewing the painful 
stimulation of the other person I felt 
understanding/empathetic/compassionate’). As such, questions referring to the 
observed painful situations could be divided into two categories: self (specific 
question referring to pain + self-items of the Batson scale, Cronbach’s α > .90) 
versus other (other-items of the Batson scale, Cronbach’s α  > .90). 
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 After the experiment, participants again filled in the IRI (Cronbach’s α 
Perspective Taking = .82, Empathic Concern = .42, Fantasy = .85, Personal 
Distress = .84). 
 Procedure. The procedure was equal to the procedure of Experiment 1, 
with the exception that subjects performed the task under both a front and under 
position setup. Furthermore, participants now performed a random number of 
movements between 15 and 20 to decrease the length of the experiment.  
Results 
A .05 significance level was used in all statistical tests. Behavioural 
outliers were defined as subjects deviating more than 2.5 SD on their general 
RHI score from the general mean of this score (n = 1; this subject was discarded 
from all further analyses). Due to equipment failure, physiological recording 
was limited to 19 subjects for all physiological measures.  
Subjective Reports. First, the behavioural questions referring to 
aspects of the RHI were inspected to verify which dimensions of the illusion 
were successfully elicited. However, since all items were strongly correlated (all 
ps < .05) and all items showed the same pattern, a general RHI score was 
calculated as the mean of the scores on these three items taken together, 
allowing us to use this single score in all further analyses (Cronbach’s α > .81). 
A 2 (Position: Front versus Under) x 2 (Condition: Imitation versus Non-
imitation) repeated measures analysis showed a significant main effect of 
Position, F(1,19) = 4.25, p < .05, d = .60 General RHI scores were higher in the 
under position setup than in the front position setup. Furthermore, the main 
effect of Condition, F(1,19) = 68.27, p < .001, d = 4.25 was also significant; 
while its interaction with Position was not, F(1,19) < 1. Scores were 
significantly higher in the imitative condition than in the non-imitative 
condition for both positions (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Mean general RHI scores (range from -5 to +5) in the imitation and non-
imitation condition in the front and under position setup in the second experiment. Error 
bars are standard errors of the mean. 
Second, all items questioning empathy for pain were divided into self- 
and other-related questions (see above), and analyzed by means of a 2 (Position: 
Front versus Under) x 2 (Condition: Imitation versus Non-imitation) x 2 
(Perspective: Self versus Other) repeated measures analysis. Only a main effect 
of Condition, F(1,19) = 15.57, p = .001, d = .60 and Perspective, F(1,19) = 
12.00, p < .01, d = 1.00, were observed (all other ps > .05). Higher scores were 
found in the imitative compared to the non-imitative condition (see Figure 4), 
and for other- compared to self-related items.   
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Figure 4: Mean scores (range from -5 to +5) in the imitation and non-imitation 
condition in the front and under position setup in the second experiment, for other- and 
self-related items referring to pain. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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 However, in order to test whether the imitation effect could be explained 
by self-other confusion, we performed a secondary mediation analysis 
investigating whether the effect of Condition on our dependent variables (other- 
and self-related behavioural scores) could be explained by RHI measures. For 
each participant, a RHI effect was calculated as the difference between general 
RHI scores in the imitation condition and the non-imitation condition, 
irrespective of positional setup (RHI effect = general RHI score in the imitation 
condition – general RHI score in the non-imitation condition). For this 
mediation analysis, we used a bootstrapping method following the procedure 
described by Preacher and Hayes (Hayes, 2009; Preacher & Hayes, 2004), a 
non-parametric resampling procedure. Figure 5 represents the effects and their 
corresponding weights that must be distinguished to perform the mediation 
analysis (only the outcome ‘other-related items’ is mentioned in the figure, 
however, the figure is applicable for all outcomes). The direct effect of 
Condition on other-related scores has the weight c’, whereas the indirect effect, 
through the proposed mediator ‘RHI effect’ has the weight ab. The effect of 
Condition on RHI effect is represented by weight a, while weight b is the effect 
of RHI effect on other-related items, partialling out the effect of Condition. The 
total effect c of Condition on other-related items consists of both the direct (c’) 
and the indirect (ab) effect. In the bootstrap analyses, the indirect effect ab is 
found to be significant if the bootstrap confidence interval excludes zero. 
Overall, mediation is assumed if 1) the total effect c is significant in addition to 
the indirect effect ab, and 2) the total effect c reduces significantly when 
controlling for the indirect effect ab (i.e. c’ is non-significant).  
 Bootstrap analyses (with 5000 resamples) for RHI effect as a mediator in 
the relation between Condition and other- and self-related items resulted in a 
significant total effect of Condition upon these items (c = .39, SE = .27, p < .05 
and c = .47, SE = .35, p < .05 respectively), but no direct effect of Condition (c’ 
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= .51, SE = .34, p > .05 and c’ = .66, SE = .45, p > .05). Furthermore, a direct 
effect of Condition upon RHI effect was found (a = 3.65, SE = .39, p < .001 and 
a = 3.65, SE = .39, p < .001 for other- and self-related items), indicating that a 
higher RHI effect was found in the imitation compared to the non-imitation 
condition. A direct effect of RHI effect on other- and self-related items was also 
found (b = .25, SE = .06, p < .001 and b = .31, SE = .08, p < .001), showing that 
a higher RHI effect resulted in higher self-report scores. Furthermore, the 
indirect effect of Condition on the dependent variable through the RHI effect 
was significant (ab = .90, SE = .23 and ab = 1.12, SE = .31) as the bootstrapped 
confidence interval excluded zero (90 % CI = .58 to 1.35 and 90 % CI = .65 to 
1.70 respectively). Finally, there were significant positive correlations between 
the RHI effect and effects on the other- and self-related scores: r = .44, p < .05 
and r = .38, p < .05 respectively.  
 
Figure 5: Effects and their corresponding weights in the mediation model. The total 
effect (c) consists of both the direct effect (c’) and the indirect effect (ab). The figure is 
applicable to all outcomes. 
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Blink modulation and ANS activity. A 2 (Position: Front versus 
Under) x 2 (Condition: Imitation versus Non-imitation) repeated measures 
analysis of the eye blink data revealed a significant main effect of Condition, 
F(1,18) = 11.53, p < .01, d = 2.72. The main effect of Position and its 
interaction with Condition, however, were non-significant (both Fs < 1; see 
Figure 6). Performing the same mediation analysis as mentioned above for self-
report measures with blink data as dependent variable resulted in similar results. 
Bootstrap analyses resulted in a significant total effect of Condition upon eye 
blink data (c = 3.78, SE = .79, p < .001), but no direct effect of Condition (c’ = 
2.68, SE = 1.10, p > .05). Furthermore, a direct effect of Condition upon RHI 
effect was found (a = 3.60, SE = .43, p < .001), while a direct effect of RHI 
effect on eye blink data was also found (b = .31, SE = .22, p < .05). Finally, the 
indirect effect of Condition on the dependent variable through the RHI effect 
was significant (ab = 1.10, SE = .87) as the bootstrapped confidence interval 
excluded zero (90 % CI = .28 to 2.61).Performing the same analysis with the 
other behavioural effects (effects of other- and self-related items) as mediators 
did not lead to a mediation pattern. 
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Figure 6: Mean blink magnitude in the imitation and non-imitation condition in the front 
and under position setup in the second experiment. Magnitude is expressed as within 
subjects T-scores, error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
Heart rate data was again insensitive to our manipulation (ps > .05), but 
skin conductance data did show similar effects as startle blink data in this 
experiment. The same 2 (Position: Front versus Under) x 2 (Condition: 
Imitation versus Non-imitation) repeated measures analysis only showed a 
significant main effect of Condition, F(1,18) = 4.56, p < .05, d = .61 (see Figure 
7). However, a mediation analysis with the behavioural RHI effect (but not with 
the other behavioural effects) revealed a significant total effect of Condition 
upon skin conductance responses (c = .19, SE = .12, p < .001), but no direct 
effect of Condition (c’ = .42, SE = .15, p > .05). Furthermore, a direct effect of 
Condition upon RHI effect was found (a = 3.34, SE = .41, p < .001). A direct 
effect of RHI effect on skin conductance data was also found (b = .07, SE = .03, 
p < .05). Finally, the indirect effect of Condition on the dependent variable 
40 
42 
44 
46 
48 
50 
52 
54 
Front Under 
M
e
a
n
 B
li
n
k
 M
a
g
n
it
u
d
e
 (
T
-s
c
o
re
) 
Position 
Imitation 
Non-imitation 
54     CHAPTER 2 
through the RHI effect was significant (ab = .23, SE = .11) as the bootstrapped 
confidence interval excluded zero (90 % CI = .06 to .44). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Mean skin conductance in the imitation and non-imitation condition in the 
front and under position setup in the second experiment. Skin conductance responses 
are expressed as the difference between the highest and the lowest value in a specified 
time window, and error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
Interestingly, there were again no significant correlations between 
behavioural and physiological data, nor were there any correlations or 
interactions with subjects’ scores on the sub-scales of the IRI (all ps > .05). 
Furthermore, no correlations between these IRI scales and the behavioural RHI 
effect were observed (all ps > .05).  
Discussion 
In this second experiment, we replicated as well as extended findings of 
the first experiment. First, behavioural and physiological measures in two 
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setups both confirmed the hypothesis that being imitated enhances affective 
responses when seeing someone else in pain. On the behavioural side, ratings 
on other- and self-related items after viewing the pain movies were higher when 
participants were being imitated during the action phase. Furthermore, mean 
blink magnitude and mean skin conductance responses were also higher in the 
imitation condition, indicating higher physiological affective responding when 
viewing someone else in pain after being imitated. However, we did not find a 
difference between the two setups we used in this experiment: both the setup 
where hands of participants were placed in front of the screen and the setup 
where participants’ hands were placed under this screen showed stronger 
responses in the imitation condition, without interaction between the two setups. 
This was somewhat unexpected, since research using sensory RHI paradigms 
has shown that a more congruent spatial position between own and rubber hand 
elicits the strongest RHI (Lloyd, 2007), and we expected this to result in higher 
empathy for pain due to increased self-other confusion. In this experiment, 
behavioural results indicated that both the front and under position setup elicited 
a very strong RHI in the imitation condition, and that this illusion was indeed 
slightly stronger in the setup with the most congruent spatial position. Although 
this suggests that our spatial position manipulation was successful, it seems that 
this stronger RHI in the under position setup failed to elicit stronger affective 
responding when viewing someone else in pain.  
 A more in depth analysis of the results, however, revealed that the 
imitation effect on affective responding when viewing someone else in pain 
disappeared when taking the behavioural RHI effect into account. Since similar 
analyses with the other behavioural effects did not result in this disappearance, 
this suggests that the differences in affective responses between the imitative 
and the non-imitative condition could – at least in part – be accounted for by the 
RHI that was very strongly elicited when being imitated. It thus seems that the 
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RHI (or self-other confusion) elicited in the imitation condition might have been 
responsible for the effect of imitation on empathy for pain, but that this effect 
could not be enhanced by a spatial position manipulation that increased the 
illusion. We believe that this was due to the fact that the imitation condition 
elicited a very strong RHI in both the front and under position setup, indicating 
that this effect was still robust under a spatial incongruent position, and might 
have already reached its limit in this condition. In a recent paper, Kalckert and 
Ehrsson (2012) used a similar motor-induced RHI and measured both agency 
and ownership over the rubber hand. When varying the spatial position with a 
180 degree rotation, ownership over this rubber hand diminished while agency 
remained very strong. Our results were not able to distinguish between 
ownership and agency, since both aspects of the RHI seemed to be elicited in 
the imitation condition in both spatial positions. However, since the hand in the 
front position setup was not completely incongruent with the position of the 
own hand, our spatial manipulation was not as strong as the one used by 
Kalckert and Ehrrson (2012). Nevertheless, both our study and the research of 
Kalckert and Ehrrson (2012) suggest that (some) measures of the RHI are 
invariant to spatial manipulations. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study, we have shown in two different experiments that being 
imitated leads to higher affective responding when seeing someone else in pain, 
both on an explicit behavioural and an implicit physiological level. Behavioural 
scores of empathy for pain were higher when subjects were being imitated in 
both experiments. Furthermore, we replicated the finding that startle blink 
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magnitude when viewing a painful movie is higher after being imitated, 
indicating stronger negative affect in this condition. Finally, the second 
experiment suggested that skin conductance (as an index of ANS activity) was 
also higher in an imitative situation, again providing evidence for stronger 
affective responding when viewing someone in pain after being imitated.  
In the second experiment, we related our setup to RHI paradigms in 
order to investigate a self-other confusion mechanism. We measured the RHI in 
our paradigm, and induced a position manipulation which was thought to 
increase this illusion. Furthermore, we expected a stronger RHI to be related to 
stronger empathy for pain. In this experiment we found an influence of both the 
position of the setup and imitative condition on the RHI, but not the predicted 
interaction between position and condition which we expected from a self-other 
confusion account. Furthermore, we found a strong effect of imitative condition 
on our measures of empathy for pain, whereas we did not find an interaction 
between condition and position of the setup. However, although we did not find 
evidence for this interaction, secondary analyses in which it was shown that 
imitation effects are mediated by RHI measures, suggested that the sharing of 
representations between self and other might nevertheless be responsible for the 
observed results. These results indicated that being imitated elicited a very 
strong RHI, and that this effect accounted for the higher affective responding in 
this imitative situation. Although it has already been shown that a RHI can 
increase affective reactions when seeing a rubber hand in pain (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Ehrsson, 2007; Famer, Tajadure-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 
2012), it has never been shown with an action induced illusion like the one used 
in the current study. Furthermore, it was shown that our action-induced RHI 
was strongly influenced by the imitation manipulation in our paradigm, while 
the spatial manipulation was less important and did not seem to influence 
affective responding to painful stimuli. It seems that being imitated elicited a 
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strong RHI that influenced empathy for pain, and that this manipulation worked 
with both a spatially congruent and incongruent position.  
 It remains an important open question, however, whether a self-other 
confusion mechanism might be important in more complex social situations as 
well, where the link with the RHI might not be as evident as it was in our 
imitative setup. Furthermore, whereas social-psychological research has 
indicated that complex prosocial effects of being imitated only take place when 
subjects are unaware of the imitative situation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van 
Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004), the imitation versus 
non-imitation situation was completely transparent in the current study. Due to 
the absence of a delay between executed and observed movement, the basic 
simplicity of these movements, and the usage of a first person perspective, it 
was immediately clear to participants whether they were being imitated or not. 
However, a study by Singer et al. (2008) indicates that prosocial behaviour and 
empathy are not necessarily positively correlated. As such, while lack of 
awareness of imitation seems necessary to elicit prosocial behaviour, our study 
indicates that empathy for pain is more immune to such a top-down modulation, 
and can be influenced by transparent imitative situations. This might suggest 
that the shared representational system acts differently under different social 
situations, and it remains to be investigated why and how this is the case. One 
possibility is that in social-psychological research, awareness of being imitated 
induces reactance because people get the impression of being mocked by the 
imitator. This is obviously not true in the present setup. Thus, it seems that the 
influence of being imitated on basic processes such as empathy for pain remains 
strong despite awareness in a setup where self-other confusion is thought to 
underlie the effects. It has to be noted, however, that we might not be able to 
generalize the results found in our particular setup to more ecologically valid 
situations. As mentioned above, several choices were made in order to increase 
I SUFFER MORE FROM YOUR PAIN WHEN YOU ACT LIKE ME   59 
self-other confusion that might have resulted in an important discrepancy 
between our setup and complex imitative situations. Furthermore, whereas 
social-psychological research usually employs real-life social interactions, the 
effects observed in the present study where based on the interaction with a 
previously videotaped hand on screen (both in the action and pain perception 
phase), without providing any social context. Importantly, pain perception 
research has indicated that online social interactions and movie- or picture-
based interactions activate both converging and diverging brain areas, with a 
core network including the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC) and bilateral 
anterior insula (AI) activated most consistently over all situations (Lamm, 
Decety, & Singer, 2011; Zaki & Ochsner, 2012). Furthermore, Perani et al. 
(2001) have also shown that virtual social interactions (e.g. using video clips) 
are associated with only part of the action observation network activated in 
natural social interactions. However, research on automatic imitation has 
consistently shown that these effects are very strong with videotaped hands (e.g. 
Brass et al., 2000; Brass et al., 2001). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated 
that participants attribute intentionality to these videotaped hands since 
manipulating this belief leads to a reduction of automatic imitation effects 
(Liepelt et al., 2008). Research by Hogeveen and Obhi (2012) has additionally 
shown that naturalistic social interaction and action observation of human 
actions involve common motor resonance mechanisms. Finally, Kalckert and 
Ehrsson (2012) have shown that only the feeling of ownership, but not of 
agency, is preserved when changing a rubber hand from a first to a third person 
perspective, suggesting that the mechanisms in both perspectives are at least 
partially different. Since we used a first person perspective setup, this would 
suggest that our paradigm might not be entirely suitable to explain common 
third person imitative experiences. Thus, it is clear that our operationalization of 
being imitated shows discrepancies with those used in social-psychological 
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research on related phenomena in naturalistic environments. Furthermore, the 
temporal contingency that is present in both experimental conditions in our 
setup (being imitated and not being imitated) also forces us to think about future 
research exploring what happens when a control condition is included in which 
no contingent reaction of the hand on screen is present (e.g. seeing a hand that 
never moves, or without any systematic relationship to the subjects’ 
movements) in order to distinguish positive effects of being imitated compared 
to negative effects of not being imitated. Although we recognize all these setup-
related differences to classical social-psychological paradigms, we nevertheless 
believe that our study might be important in understanding social (imitative) 
interactions, especially since all studies mentioned above show – next to 
diverging activations – partially overlapping areas being activated when 
comparing real-life and experimentally induced interactions as well. However, 
we also believe it is important to further investigate all these aspects in more 
depth, and explore in which social interactions a mechanism assuming 
overlapping self-other representations might be relevant.    
 Another important limitation of the study is the indirect nature in which 
empathy for pain is measured. Therefore, future research is needed to 
investigate directly whether being imitated leads to stronger activation of pain-
related brain areas with brain imaging techniques. Research indicates that the 
affective-motivational dimensions of pain, including the bilateral AI and the 
dorsal ACC, are most consistently activated when seeing someone else in pain 
(Singer et al., 2004; Lamm et al., 2011). However, some studies suggest that the 
sensory dimensions of pain are affected in these situations as well (Keysers et 
al., 2010; Loggia et al., 2008). Based on the present results, we would expect 
affective (and sensory) parts of the pain matrix to show stronger activation 
when seeing someone else in pain after being imitated compared to not being 
imitated. Furthermore, regions such as the temporal parietal junction and the 
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medial prefrontal cortex have been related to shared representational processes 
such as self-other distinction (Decety, Chaminade, Grèzes, & Meltzoff, 2002; 
Farrer & Frith, 2002; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010). Since there is an 
obvious link between these mechanisms and the account used to explain the 
results in the present paper, we think it warranted to explore the involvement of 
these regions in our paradigm as well.  
 As a final comment, we would like to point out that it is somewhat 
disputable whether the term ‘empathy for pain’ is adequate to describe the 
results in our study, since empathy requires the ability to experience feelings of 
the other person while at the same time being able to recognize this person as 
another entity. A self-other confusion process, which we believe to be the 
underlying mechanism of the effects in our study, would suggest otherwise. 
However, although our autonomic results suggest that there is self-other 
confusion at an implicit level, our behavioural results in both experiments 
indicate that people still consciously seem to distinguish self from other. 
Responses to other- and self-related questions were differently rated, with 
higher scores on other-related than on self-related subjective judgments. This 
suggests that self-other confusion was not complete, and we therefore opted to 
use the term empathy for pain nevertheless. However, our results suggest that 
this term might not encompass the whole process. 
To summarize, our data suggest that being imitated leads to a stronger 
affective response when seeing someone else in pain. This suggests a tight link 
between shared representation on the motor and the sensory level. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
EFFECTS OF BEING IMITATED ON MOTOR RESPONSES 
EVOKED BY PAIN OBSERVATION: EXERTING CONTROL 
DETERMINES ACTION TENDENCIES WHEN PERCEIVING 
PAIN IN OTHERS
1
 
Brain imaging research has shown that experiencing pain oneself and perceiving 
pain in others lead to a similar pattern of activation, suggesting that the latter is 
based on internal simulation of the observed pain. Further evidence for this idea 
stems from transcranial magnetic stimulation measuring corticospinal 
excitability (CSE). It has been demonstrated that our motor cortex is involved 
whenever we observe another person receiving painful stimulation to the hand 
(e.g. Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005). However, both decreases and 
increases of CSE have been described during pain observation. Hence the exact 
nature of these CSE changes has remained unclear so far. In the present study, 
we hypothesized that CSE changes are determined by the control that the 
observer has over the hand that receives painful stimulation. To test this 
hypothesis, we manipulated the control over the observed hand using a paradigm 
in which participants’ movements are being imitated by a hand on screen – 
giving them full control over the hand – or not. In accordance with previous 
results, we evidenced a decrease in CSE when participants experienced no 
control over the hand that received painful stimulation. In contrast, inducing 
control resulted in an increase in CSE. We conclude that exerting control over 
the observed hand leads to a completely altered action tendency. Whereas an 
anaesthetic response is typically observed in the absence of control, increasing 
control induces motor facilitation reminiscent of preparation of an avoidance 
response.  
  
                                                     
1
 De Coster, L., Andres, M., & Brass, M. (2014). Effects of being imitated on motor 
responses evoked by pain observation: Exerting control determines action tendencies 
when perceiving pain in others. Journal of Neuroscience, 34, 6952-6957. doi: 
10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5044-13.2014 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Since the study of Singer et al. (2004), it has been repeatedly shown that 
the observation of pain in a model results in pain-related brain activation in the 
observer (for a review see Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011).  More recently, 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies have investigated how our motor 
system responds when perceiving pain in others. Interestingly, these studies have 
shown that the observation of painful stimulation delivered to the hand of a 
human model induces a decrease in corticospinal excitability (CSE) in the hand 
of the observer (e.g. Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Avenanti, Minio-
Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006). It has been argued that this inhibitory effect 
is similar to what happens on the motor level when experiencing pain oneself 
(e.g. Farina, Tinazzi, Le Pera, & Valeriani, 2003; Le Pera et al., 2001; Urban et 
al., 2004). However, recent findings indicate that the decrease in CSE observed 
while perceiving pain in others is not always found. It has been shown that this 
inhibition is reduced in individuals with high levels of trait-personal distress 
(Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2009). Furthermore, Fitzgibbon et 
al. (2012) have shown that pain synesthetes (i.e. individuals who experience 
actual pain when observing injury to another) show a significant increase in CSE 
while observing pain in others. These discrepant results raise questions about the 
factors that determine the nature of CSE changes induced by pain observation. A 
potential hypothesis is that, in experiments demonstrating an anaesthetic motor 
inhibition after painful stimulation, participants were unable to avoid the pain or 
predict the exact timing of painful stimulation (e.g. Le Pera et al., 2001; Urban et 
al., 2004). Similarly, in experiments where participants perceive pain in others, 
the decrease in CSE is typically associated with an absence of control over the 
hand in pain. On the other hand, high levels of personal distress or synesthetic 
sensations may enhance the feeling that pain is inflicted on one’s own hand and 
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activate motor control processes, resulting in increased CSE as a reflection of 
planning an avoidance reaction to the observed pain. In the present study, we 
tested the original hypothesis that the nature of the CSE changes evoked by 
perceiving others’ hand receiving painful stimulation is determined by our ability 
to exert control over this hand.  
  We recently manipulated the sense of control participants had over an 
observed hand in pain using a well-established imitation paradigm (De Coster, 
Verschuere, Goubert, Tsakiris, & Brass, 2013). In an imitative condition a hand 
on screen imitated participants, giving them perfect control over this hand. In a 
non-imitative condition, the hand was performing non-matching movements. We 
showed that affective reactions to perceiving painful stimulation in others were 
enhanced after being imitated by the other person and that this enhancement was 
related to an increase in control. In the present study, this imitation paradigm 
allowed us to investigate whether inducing control over the hand on screen 
determines whether perceiving pain in this hand will lead to increased or 
decreased CSE.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Participants 
 Twenty-five healthy young adult men (mean age = 22.44 years, SD = 2.03) 
participated in the study in exchange for 40 Euros, and provided written consent 
beforehand. All participants had no history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders, had normal or corrected-to normal vision, and were negative for the 
risk factors associated with TMS (Rossi et al., 2009). The procedures were non-
invasive and were performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down 
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in the 1964 Helsinki Declaration. The study was granted ethical approval by the 
Medical Ethical Review Board of Ghent University Hospital.   
Experimental design 
  Blocks of trials consisted of two phases: an action phase in which 
movements of the subjects were imitated (exerting control block) or not (not 
exerting control block), and a pain perception phase which immediately followed 
the action phase. In the pain perception phase, one of ten pain movies was 
presented (‘bore goes into the back of the hand’, ’hammer is smacked on the back 
of the hand’, ‘hot iron is pressed on the back of the hand’, ‘knife cuts the back of 
the hand’, ‘nail is knocked into the back of the hand with a hammer’, ‘nail of the 
ring finger is pulled out of the hand’, ‘paper makes a paper cut in the back of the 
hand’, ‘pinchers pinch the back of the hand’, ‘sandpaper is rubbed over the back 
of the hand’, ‘stapler puts a staple into the back of the hand’), or a neutral movie 
was shown in which a still hand appeared on screen, serving as a baseline for the 
pain movies. Each pain movie was combined two times with both an exerting 
control and not exerting control block, while the neutral movie was combined 20 
times with each block to ensure that an equal amount of pain and neutral movies 
was presented. As such, the experiment consisted of 80 trials. The association of 
the different pain/neutral movies with the different block conditions was 
completely randomized across participants. 
Stimuli and apparatus 
 Stimulus material consisted of three types of 720 x 576 video-clips created 
by professionals: a hand in a resting position, simple finger movements (for the 
action phase of the task), and pain movies showing a hand receiving pain 
stimulation (for the pain movies in the pain perception phase).  
 During the action phase of the experimental task, participants carried out 
simple finger movements of the index, middle, ring, or little finger. These finger 
movements were recorded with a custom-built response device using light 
EXERTING CONTROL DETERMINES ACTION TENDENCIES   73 
sensors. This device allowed us to use finger lifting movements of participants as 
triggers for the presentation of the appropriate finger movement video. Temporal 
resolution was optimized (see Procedure) so that participants immediately viewed 
a video-taped finger movement on screen after initiating a finger movement with 
their own hand. For example, in an exerting control block, the lifting of an index 
finger resulted in the presentation of the index finger lifting video, while the 
middle, ring, or little finger lifting video was shown in a not exerting control 
block. All finger movement clips had a total duration of 2000 ms. 
 The perception phase of the experimental task consisted of the presentation 
of one of ten pain movies in which painful stimulation was applied to the hand on 
screen, or a resting state movie in which the right hand was displayed palm down 
with fingers slightly spread. The position of the video-taped hand matched the 
position of the participants’ right hand on the response box. All movies had a 
total duration of 8000 ms. The resting state movie served as a neutral/baseline 
movie for the pain movies (Avenanti et al., 2009). Practical constraints (including 
timing of the experiment) detained us from using additional control conditions in 
which hands are innocuously touched by similar objects. While several studies 
have shown that CSE is modulated by observation of pain but not of touch stimuli 
(e.g. Avenanti et al., 2005, Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti, 2010) we cannot exclude 
the possibility that our modulations are not specific for pain and can be extended 
to any hand-object interaction.  
Procedure 
  Participants were seated in front of a standard computer screen at arm 
length, and asked to place the four fingers of their right hand on a custom-made 
response box. Display of stimulus material and recording of responses were 
conducted with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). As soon 
as the video-taped right hand appeared on screen (resting state movie), subjects 
were instructed to voluntary move a randomly chosen finger that was placed on 
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the response box. Immediately after movement of one of the subjects’ fingers 
(delay = 0 ms, estimate of intrinsic delay of computer/software = 66.93 ms), a 
movie was shown in which the hand on screen performed the same or a different 
movement for exerting control and not exerting control blocks respectively. After 
a random number between 10 and 15 of such movements (all imitative or all non-
imitative), one of the pain movies or the neutral movie was immediately 
presented. After a pain movie, participants had to rate the behavioural statement 
‘I felt pain on my own hand when I saw the hand on screen receiving painful 
stimulation’ on a scale from -5 to +5. During the pain movies, a TMS pulse was 
applied at the exact time when the painful tool contacted the skin surface. During 
the neutral movie, the TMS pulse was delivered at 2900 ms, corresponding to the 
average of the TMS pulse onset across all pain movies. 
Before the start of the experiment, participants’ TMS motor threshold 
was measured as described in the TMS and Electromyography paragraph below. 
Afterwards, they performed two practice blocks (both an exerting control and a 
not exerting control block), in which a pain movie was shown that was not used 
during the experimental phase and no TMS pulse was applied. During these 
practice blocks, it was verified whether participants understood all aspects of the 
experimental procedure.  
 Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants filled in the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980; for Dutch translation see De Corte et al., 
2007), used as a measure of trait empathy. This questionnaire consists of 28 items 
which have to be rated on a 5-point Likert scale, and can be divided into four 
subscales: Perspective Taking (PT, the tendency to spontaneously imagine and 
assume the cognitive perspective of another person), Empathic Concern (EC, the 
tendency to feel sympathy and compassion for others in need), Fantasy (FS, the 
tendency to project oneself into the place of fictional characters in books and 
movies), and Personal Distress (PD, the extent to which an individual feels 
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distress as a result of witnessing another’s emotional distress). Cronbach’s α in 
the current study for PT was .83, for EC .74, for FS .79, and for PD .80. 
  TMS and electromyography 
Single pulse TMS was delivered through a biphasic magnetic stimulator 
(Rapid
2
 Magstim, Whitland, UK) connected to a polyeruthane-coated figure-of-
eight coil (5.4-cm inner diameter windings). The coil was held tangentially over 
the left hand motor area, with the handle pointing backwards and forming an 
angle of 45° with the sagittal plane. Participants wore earplugs to attenuate the 
coil noise. Electromyographical (EMG) activity was recorded with the 
ActiveTwo system (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). Sintered 11 x 17-
mm active Ag–AgCl electrodes were placed over the right First Dorsal 
Interosseus muscle (FDI) and the right Brachioradialis muscle (BR) in a belly–
tendon arrangement. The FDI contributes to flex or abduct the index away from 
the middle finger, whereas the main action of the BR is to flex the forearm at the 
elbow. These muscles were chosen because they are involved, respectively, in 
finger and hand retraction, two reactions commonly observed in response to 
painful stimuli as used in our study. The hot spot in the hand motor area was 
established by locating a stimulation site where TMS elicited motor evoked 
potentials (MEPs) in the two muscles. TMS intensity was set at 110 % of the 
resting motor threshold, i.e. the minimum intensity to induce an MEP ≥ 50 µV 
peak to peak in both muscles with 50 % probability. In 14 out of 25 participants, 
the TMS parameters were defined according to the FDI only because it was not 
possible to elicit MEPs in both muscles from the same stimulation site. The data 
collected from the BR in other participants were excluded from further analyses 
because the number of trials where an MEP was observed during the experiment 
was too small. Average intensity (± S.D.) was 71.25 (± 16.98) % of the maximal 
stimulator output. EMG signal was amplified (internal gain scaling), digitized at 2 
kHz, high-pass filtered at 3 Hz, and stored on a PC for off-line analysis.       
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Data analyses 
Trials were excluded when the root mean square (RMS) of the 
background EMG signal recorded in the FDI 500 ms before TMS was higher than 
50 µV. For each subject, the top and bottom 5% of MEPs were trimmed and the 
peak-to-peak amplitude of the remaining MEPs was computed using Matlab. For 
both control conditions separately, the MEPs in each pain condition were 
expressed as a percentage of change with respect to its corresponding baseline as 
follows: 100 * (Pain – Neutral)/Neutral. The baseline conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other, t(24) = 1.34, p = .20. 
Planned comparisons between exerting control and not exerting control 
over the observed hand were performed for behavioural and TMS data using 
paired T-tests. For the latter, additional analyses were performed to rule out that 
the effects described in the Results section were due to differences in background 
EMG activity. These analyses showed that our manipulation did not influence the 
RMS of the EMG signal recorded from the FDI during a 500 ms delay before the 
TMS (all p-values >.20).  
Pearson correlations were computed between the average ratings on each 
subscale of the IRI and the percentage of change in MEP amplitude in the 
exerting control and not exerting control conditions. One outlier participant was 
identified using Cook’s distance and subsequently removed from the correlation 
analysis.  
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RESULTS 
Subjective Reports 
 In accordance with previous results (De Coster et al., 2013), a paired T-test 
revealed that scores were significantly higher in the exerting control compared to 
the not exerting control condition: t(24) = 2.31, p < .05, d = .15 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Mean scores on the question ‘I felt pain on my own hand when I saw the hand 
on screen receiving painful stimulation’ (range from -5 to +5) in the exerting control and 
not exerting control condition after observing a pain movie. Error bars are standard errors 
of the mean. 
 
TMS data 
 Planned comparisons of the percentage of change in MEP amplitude in the 
FDI showed a significant difference between the exerting control and not exerting 
control condition: t(24) = 3.44, p < .01, d = 1.87. As shown in Figure 2, MEP 
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amplitude decreased in the not exerting control condition (one –sample T-test 
against 0: t(24) = -2.29, p < .05, d = .93), replicating previous findings (e.g. 
Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006). In contrast, MEP amplitude increased in the exerting 
control condition (one –sample T-test against 0: t(24) = 2.63, p < .05, d = 1.07).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean CSE in the exerting control and not exerting control, computed as the 
percentage change compared to baseline [100 * (Pain – Neutral)/Neutral]. Error bars are 
standard errors of the mean. 
 
 Correlations were computed between the average rating of each subscale of 
the IRI and the percentage of change in MEP amplitude, averaged for the exerting 
control and not exerting control condition separately. A negative relationship was 
found between PT and MEP amplitude in the not exerting control condition (r = -
.60, p < .01; see Figure 3a). In other words, participants who were more likely to 
cognitively infer others’ states showed a stronger inhibition at the motor level. 
Furthermore, a positive relationship was found between PD and MEP amplitude 
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in the exerting control condition (r = .53, p < .01; see Figure 3b), meaning that 
participants who were more likely to feel distressed about seeing someone else 
suffering showed a stronger motor facilitation. No other correlations were found 
between subscales of the IRI and the change in MEP amplitude in the exerting or 
not exerting control condition (all ps > .05).  
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Figure 3: A. Correlation between mean IRI Perspective Taking (PT) score and mean CSE 
in the not exerting control condition. B. Correlation between mean IRI Personal Distress 
(PD) score and mean CSE in the exerting control condition. 
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DISCUSSION 
 In this TMS experiment, we investigated whether action tendencies evoked 
by painful stimuli delivered to the hand of a human model depend on the ability 
to exert control over the observed hand. Subjects observed the hand of another 
person receiving painful stimulation, after being imitated by this hand or not. 
During the pain perception phase, TMS-induced MEPs were measured in the 
right dominant hand of participants. In accordance with previous results, we 
showed that when participants did not exert control over the hand that received 
painful stimulation (i.e. incongruent movements), decreased CSE was found 
during pain observation. By contrast, when participants exerted control over the 
hand that received painful stimulation (i.e. congruent movements), increased CSE 
was observed. 
 It has been repeatedly shown that observing others in pain does not only 
generate affective but also sensory-motor responses in the observer (Keysers, 
Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010; Lamm et al., 2011). Indeed, several TMS studies 
exploring reactions to perceiving pain in others evidenced decreased excitability 
in the motor system of the observer. This decrease has been shown to be specific 
to the body part that was hurt in others and to correlate with the pain intensity as 
estimated by the observer (e.g. Avenanti et al., 2005, 2006; Minio-Paluello, 
Avenanti, & Aglioti, 2006). It has been argued that this inhibition reflects a 
freezing response that is similar to the reaction observed when actually 
experiencing pain (e.g. Farina et al., 2003; Le Pera et al., 2001; Urban et al., 
2004). Other research, however, has shown that high levels of personal 
involvement are associated with reduced motor inhibition during pain observation 
(Avenanti et al., 2009). Moreover, Fitzgibbon et al. (2012) have shown that pain 
synesthetes show a significant increase of CSE when observing someone else in 
pain. The current study accounts for these discrepancies by showing that action 
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tendencies are modulated by the level of control participants exerted over the 
hand that received painful stimulation. 
 Several TMS studies have shown that increased CSE might reflect 
anticipatory changes to perception of negative emotional cues (Oliveri et al., 
2003; Koganemaru, Domen, Fukuyama, & Mima, 2012; Borgomaneri, Gazzola, 
& Avenanti, 2013). Furthermore, it has been shown that the motor system 
implements anticipatory simulations of expected actions (Avenanti, Annella, 
Candidi, Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2013; Borroni, Montagna, Cerri, & Baldissera, 2005; 
Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; Urgesi et al., 2010). We 
assume that the facilitation of CSE observed in the exerting control condition 
reflects planning of an avoidance reaction to the observed pain. In particular, this 
increased CSE might reflect an unspecific muscle tension halting ongoing 
behaviour in order to prepare for a potential avoidance response. Such an 
avoidance response is only adaptive when the agent has the possibility to escape 
the painful stimulation. Previous studies examining CSE when experiencing pain 
oneself used methods (e.g. saline injection, electrical stimulation) that prevent 
preparation of appropriate reactions to avoid pain (e.g. Le Pera et al., 2001; Urban 
et al., 2004). In such situations where it is already too late to stop or avoid the 
painful stimulation, an anaesthetic motor inhibition is the most adaptive response. 
By definition, situations in which participants passively observe pain to the hand 
of a human model preclude an active avoidance response, and thus anaesthetic 
motor inhibition is displayed. In a previous study, De Coster et al. (2013) showed 
a reduced sense of agency when the hand that receives pain does not imitate the 
finger movements executed by participants. In this sense, the “not exerting 
control” condition is similar to observing others in pain without any possibility to 
prepare an avoidance reaction to this pain. In support of this view and in line with 
previous research (Avenanti et al., 2009; Avenanti  et al., 2010; Minio-Paluello, 
Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009), a correlation was found in our 
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study between this inhibitory effect and the individual ratings of perspective 
taking, a cognitive marker of empathy, in the not exerting control condition. It 
seems that the more a participant feels able to cognitively change his/her 
perspective to adopt others’ point of view, the more he/she experiences motor 
inhibition during pain observation. Interestingly, Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, 
and Perry (2009) suggested that perspective taking is closely related to Theory of 
Mind abilities and the awareness that others’ states are different from one’s own. 
By contrast, being imitated provides participants with a feeling of control over the 
model hand, due to an increased self-other overlap (De Coster et al., 2013). The 
more participants are distressed about seeing the hand that they can control, the 
more they show activation in this hand. This correlation is in accordance with 
Borgomaneri et al. (2013) who found that inter-individual differences in personal 
distress were positively correlated with an increased CSE. Interestingly, facilitory 
CSE responses when viewing negative stimuli seem to be muscle unspecific (e.g. 
Borgomaneri et al., 2013). This raises the possibility that facilitation of CSE 
might be part of a more generalized preparatory response towards negative 
situations, especially since Borgamaneri et al. (2013) indicated the very early 
nature of these facilitory responses. This might indicate that the first response to a 
threatening situation is a complete and unspecific muscle tension that serves the 
role of stopping ongoing behaviour and preparing avoidance. Unfortunately, we 
were not able to test this hypothesis because the data from the only other muscle 
we measured (the BR muscle) were not reliable.  
 In accordance with previous results (De Coster et al., 2013), we showed 
that behavioural self-reports of pain intensity were higher in the exerting control 
condition compared to the not exerting control condition. Furthermore, in this 
previous study both other- and self-oriented feelings were rated higher in the 
exerting control condition, reflecting concern and personal distress respectively 
(Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). In addition, we found that not only 
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agency/control was higher in the imitation condition, but that this condition 
elicited higher body ownership as well. In particular, we demonstrated that 
exerting control induced a rubber hand illusion (RHI) indicating enhanced body 
ownership (De Coster et al., 2013). It is therefore an open question whether the 
effect of exerting control directly influenced the action tendency or whether this 
effect is mediated by increased body ownership. In any case, our study is the first 
experimental study showing increased CSE in a situation where self-other overlap 
is high. While it has been shown using fMRI that threatening a rubber hand that 
feels as if it is your own hand increases brain activity in pain-related and motor-
related areas (Ehrsson, Wiech, Welskopf, Dolan, & Passingham, 2007), the 
specific nature of the motor response (inhibition or facilitation) cannot be 
investigated with fMRI. Interestingly, other research (Schütz-Bosbach, Mancini, 
Aglioti, & Haggard, 2006; Schütz-Bosbach, Avenanti, Aglioti, & Haggard, 2009) 
has shown that when applying motor TMS in a RHI paradigm (without 
observation of noxious stimulation), differential modulation of the FDI was 
present as well. While asynchronous stimulation (no RHI) led to increased MEP 
amplitude and reduced cortical silent period duration when observing index 
finger movements, synchronous stimulation (RHI) led to the opposite pattern. 
These results confirm the idea that self-other overlap can modulate CSE, 
reflecting appropriate responses to the observed stimuli. 
 In addition, our study provides the first systematic evidence that CSE 
changes induced by pain observation are mediated by the merging of self-other 
representations. Although it has been widely accepted that the inhibitory effect is 
due to an embodiment  of the observed pain, this has never been systematically 
demonstrated. With the current paradigm we demonstrated that CSE effects in the 
“exerting control” condition are qualitatively different from those in the “not 
exerting control” condition. Our study thus suggests that increasing self-other 
overlap (due to being imitated in the “exerting” condition) leads to a facilitation 
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of MEPs when observing pain, and that this facilitation is higher for people who 
are more strongly affected by other’s distress. As such, these results indicate that 
being imitated has a strong influence both on emotional reactions, such as 
empathy for pain, and bodily reactions in the observer. Enhancing self-other 
overlap by being imitated thus provides a novel and original paradigm for 
investigating pathological populations, such as autism or schizophrenic 
individuals, who show altered emotional reactions that are related to deficiencies 
in self-other representations (e.g. autism, schizophrenia). 
 In sum, our results indicate that whether we exert control over an observed 
body part or not determines the nature of the CSE changes consecutive to 
perceiving pain in others. While having no control leads to motor inhibition when 
observing someone in pain, exerting control leads to motor facilitation. We argue 
that this increase in CSE response reflects the tendency to prepare for avoidance 
of the painful stimulation. By contrast, having no control over the hand rather 
elicits an anaesthetic response, as evidenced by motor inhibition.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
AN FMRI STUDY ON THE INFLUENCE OF BEING 
IMITATED ON EMPATHY FOR PAIN
1
 
Being imitated has been shown to have several positive social consequences. 
In a recent study, it was shown that being imitated does not only affect 
complex social behaviour, but that it influences a basic process such as 
empathy for pain as well. Empathy for pain refers to the idea that pain-
related brain activation is found when observing someone else in pain. In a 
paradigm designed to investigate the influence of being imitated on empathy 
for pain, participants’ finger movements are being imitated by a hand on 
screen or not. Subsequently, the hand on screen receives painful stimulation. 
In the current fMRI study, brain activation was measured to investigate 
which brain areas related to pain observation are modulated by being 
imitated. Furthemore, it was explored whether neural evidence was found 
for the idea that self-other overlap underlies this effect. Peak activity was 
found in the right dorsal anterior insula (AI), supporting the idea that being 
imitated enhances activation in pain-related brain areas. Interestingly, this 
region has been related to translation of affective states into action 
tendencies. Furthermore, activation was found in the right temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ), a region associated with self-other distinction. This activity 
was positively correlated with activation in the AI, indicating that stronger 
affective responding was associated with a greater need for distinction 
between self and other. These results provided the first direct evidence for 
the idea that being imitated modulates empathy for pain, and support a 
shared representational account.   
 
                                                     
1
De Coster, L., Desmet, C., Demanet, J., Goubert, L., & Brass, M. (in preparation). 
An fMRI study on the influence of being imitated on empathy for pain.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Imitation is important for our daily social interactions, changing the 
way we experience others. Research has indicated that being imitated elicits 
positive social behaviour towards others (K hn et al., 2010; Lakin, 
Chartrand, &Arkin, 2008; Stel, van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008). Chartrand and 
Bargh (1999), for example, have shown that we like someone who imitates 
us more, and that interactions with this person run more smoothly 
(Chameleon effect). This raises the question whether being imitated also 
affects more basic social-cognitive processes such as empathy for pain. In 
her seminal study, Singer et al. (2004) showed that perceiving another 
person in pain activates brain regions involved in the affective–motivational 
dimensions of pain (see also Goubert, Vervoort, & Craig, 2012; Jackson, 
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 
2006). Originally thought that this phenomenon, called empathy for pain, 
only comprised the affective part of the pain matrix (including areas such as 
the anterior insula, AI and anterior cingulate cortex, ACC), research has 
since then shown that sensory sharing takes place as well (for a review see 
Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010, for a meta-analysis see Lamm et al., 2011). 
Moreover, research has indicated that sharing of representations when 
observing someone else in pain is modulated both by top-down mechanisms 
(e.g. Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, Echols, & Corell, 2009; de Vignemont & 
Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 2008; Lamm, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2010; 
Singer et al., 2006), and bottom-up features (e.g. Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008; 
Yang, Decety, Lee, Chen, & Cheng, 2009; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009), 
suggesting that both factors contribute to the empathic response (Decety & 
Lamm, 2006). The general aim of the current study was to investigate the 
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role of being imitated on brain activation when observing someone else in 
pain.  
 In a recent study, De Coster, Verschuere, Goubert, Tsakiris, & Brass 
(2013) were able to show that observing someone else in pain is influenced 
by being imitated due to increased self-other merging. In this experiment, 
subjects were imitated by a hand on screen or not, and subsequently saw this 
hand receiving painful stimulation. During this pain perception phase, 
affective responses were higher when previously being imitated. 
Furthermore, a second experiment indicated that this effect was mediated by 
increased self-other merging. In a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
study, it was shown that action tendencies were differentially affected by the 
imitation manipulation (De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2014), suggesting that 
bodily reactions when observing pain can be influenced by self-other overlap 
via an imitation manipulation.  
 In the current study, we used the aforementioned paradigm to 
investigate which brain regions are active when observing someone else in 
pain after being imitated. Investigating the influence of being imitated on 
brain activation during pain perception allows us to address two fundamental 
questions. First, we could investigate which part of the pain matrix is more 
strongly activated when empathy for pain is modulated by being imitated. 
Secondly, it was possible to provide neural evidence for the idea that self-
other overlap might underlie the effect. As mentioned above, it was 
suggested in De Coster et al. (2013) that increased self-other merging 
mediates the effect of being imitated on empathy for pain. Based on previous 
imaging work on self-other distinction it could be predicted that the 
temporo-parietal junction is involved (TPJ, Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; 
Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010). Thus, the current study allowed us to 
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additionally test the hypothesis that manipulation of being imitated 
modulates activation in the TPJ. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
 Nineteen healthy female volunteers (mean age = 23 years, SD = 3.04) 
participated in the study in exchange for 29 Euros. One participant was 
excluded from analyses due to inability to perform the task adequately. All 
participants were right handed as measured by the Edinburgh Inventory 
(Oldfield, 1971). They provided written consent beforehand and had no 
history of neurological disorders. Ethical approval was granted by the 
Medical Ethical Review Board of the Ghent University Hospital.  
Experimental design 
  Trials consisted of two phases: an action phase in which movements 
of the subjects were imitated or not, and a pain perception phase which 
immediately followed the action phase. In the pain perception phase, one of 
ten pain movies (‘bore goes into the back of the hand’, ’hammer is smacked 
on the back of the hand’, ‘hot iron is pressed on the back of the hand’, ‘knife 
cuts the back of the hand’, ‘nail is knocked into the back of the hand with a 
hammer’, ‘nail of the ring finger is pulled out of the hand’, ‘paper makes a 
paper cut in the back of the hand’, ‘pinchers pinch the back of the hand’, 
‘sandpaper is rubbed over the back of the hand’, ‘stapler puts a staple into 
the back of the hand’), or one of two neutral movie was presented (‘cue tip is 
rubbed on the back of the hand’, ‘cotton-wool is rubbed on the back of the 
hand’). Seven pain movies were chosen randomly per subject, which 
ensured that nine different movies were shown. Each movie was presented 
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four times with both an imitation and a non-imitation trial, resulting in a total 
amount of 72 trials, divided into two parts of 36 trials. 
Stimuli and apparatus 
 Display of stimulus material and recording of responses were 
conducted with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). 
Stimulus material consisted of three types of 720 x 576 video-clips created 
by professionals: a hand in a resting position, simple finger movements (for 
the action phase of the task), and pain movies showing a hand receiving pain 
stimulation or neutral movies showing a hand receiving non-painful 
stimulation (for the movies in the pain perception phase). 
 During the action phase of the experimental task, participants carried 
out simple finger movements of the index, middle, ring, or little finger. 
These finger movements were recorded with an fMRI-compatible response 
box. Participants were instructed to press one of four buttons with one of 
their four fingers, and perform a finger lifting movement immediately 
afterwards. Temporal resolution was optimized so that participants 
immediately viewed a video-taped finger movement on screen after pressing 
a response button and performing the lifting movement with their own hand. 
For example, in an imitation block, the pressing of the response button with 
and lifting of the index finger resulted in the presentation of the index finger 
lifting video, while the middle, ring, or little finger lifting video was shown 
in a non-imitation block. All finger movement clips had a total duration of 
2000 ms. 
 The perception phase of the experimental task consisted of the 
presentation of a pain/neutral movie in which painful/non-painful 
stimulation was applied to the hand on screen. The position of the video-
taped hand matched the position of the participants’ right hand on the 
response box. All movies had a total duration of 8000 ms.  
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Procedure 
  Participants were lying in the scanner while attentively performing 
the task and watching the movies. As soon as a video-taped right hand 
appeared on screen (resting position movie), subjects were instructed to 
voluntary move a randomly chosen finger that was placed on the response 
box by pressing the response button and making a lifting movement 
immediately afterwards. After pressing the response button, a movie was 
shown in which the hand on screen performed the same or a different 
movement for imitation and non-imitation blocks respectively. After a 
random number between 10 and 15 of such movements (all imitative or all 
non-imitative), one of the pain or neutral movies was immediately presented. 
After pain movies only, participants had to rate the behavioural statements 
‘How unpleasant do you think the other person found the pain stimulation?’ 
(other-affective), ‘How intense do you think the other person experienced 
painful sensations?’ (other-sensory), ‘How unpleasant did you find the pain 
stimulation yourself?’ (self-affective), and ‘How intense did you experience 
painful sensations yourself?’ (self-sensory) on a scale from -5 to +5. After 
responding to this last question, a new trial started. Jitters were introduced 
between the action phase and pain perception phase, between the pain 
perception phase and rating of the behavioural questions, and at the end of 
the trial. A pseudo logarithmic jitter was applied for all jitters. Half of the 
intertrial intervals were short (range between 200-2000 ms in steps of 
600ms), one third were intermediate (range between 2600 ms and 4400 ms) 
and one sixth was long (range between 5000 ms and 6800 ms) with a mean 
intertrialinterval of 2700 ms. A short break was inserted in the middle of the 
experiment. 
Before the start of the experiment, participants performed two 
practice blocks (both an imitation and a non-imitation block) outside of the 
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scanner, in which a pain movie was shown that was not used during the 
experimental phase. During these practice blocks, subjects were made aware 
of the procedure in the scanner, and it was verified whether they understood 
all aspects of the experimental procedure.  
Image acquisition and statistical analysis 
 MRI images were acquired with a 3T scanner (Siemens Trio) 
combined with a 32-channel radiofrequency head coil. Subjects were entered 
head first and supine into the magnet bore. Scanning started with 176 high-
resolution anatomical images using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence 
([repetition time (TR) = 2530 ms, echo time (TE) = 2.58 ms, image matrix = 
256 x 256, field of view (FOV) = 220 mm, flip angle = 7°, slice thickness = 
0.90 mm, voxel size = 0.9 x 0.86 x 0.86 mm (resized tot 1 x 1 x 1 mm)]. 
Next, two runs of whole-brain functional images were conducted using a 
T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence, sensitive to BOLD 
contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 35 ms, image matrix = 64 x 64, FOV = 224 
mm, flip angle = 80°, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, distance factor = 17 %, 
voxel size = 3.5 x 3.5 x 3 mm, 30 axial slices). The amount of EPI images 
depended upon the self-paced speed of subjects during the trials, namely 
speed of finger movement execution and rating of self-reports.  
 All data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, UCL, London, U.K.; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). In order to account for T1 relaxation 
effects, each EPI sequence started with four dummy scans. First, all 
functional images were spatially realigned using rigid body transformation. 
After realignment, images were slice time corrected using with respect to the 
middle acquired slice. The structural image of each subject was co-registered 
with their mean functional image. Further, all functional images were 
normalized based on the T1-derived normalization parameters. Finally, the 
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images were resampled into 3.5 mm
3 
voxels and spatially smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half maximum).  
 A high pass filter of 128 s was applied during fMRI data analysis. 
Statistical analyses were performed using the general linear model 
implemented in SPM8. One model was created for the imitation phase and 
the pain perception phase. First, the imitation phase was modeled by looking 
at activation related to being imitated. For this phase, we modeled the 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) during the entire imitation 
phase. The duration of this phase was dependent on the speed of 
participants’ finger movements, of which 10 to 15 were required. Second, 
the activation during pain observation was modeled. The HRF was modeled 
at the time point when the tool with which painful/non-painful stimulation 
was applied appeared on screen. The model included regressors for Action 
condition (Imitation vs. Nonimitation) and Perception condition (Pain vs. 
Neutral), and an additional twelve regressors (six for each run) to control for 
residual head movements artifacts. Contrast images of interest were 
computed at first level by comparing parameter estimates for the canonical 
HRF. These contrast images were then entered into a second level analysis 
using one-sample T-tests. We will focus on clusters that were significant (p 
< .05, corrected) as calculated by SPM8 after applying a whole brain 
uncorrected threshold of p < .001.  
RESULTS 
Subjective reports 
 Except for the first question referring to unpleasant feelings of the 
other person, all subjective reports resulted in higher ratings after being 
AN FMRI STUDY     97 
imitated compared to not being imitated (see Table 1); paired t(17) = 2.12, p 
< .05, d = .16; t(17) = 2.49, p < .05, d = .32; t(17) = 3.05, p < .01, d = .61 for 
the questions referring to other-sensory, self-affective, and self-sensory 
aspects respectively.  
 
Table 1: Four behavioural questions, the aspect of empathy for pain they 
refer to, and their corresponding mean scores (standard deviations) in the 
different conditions (range from -5 to +5). 
 
Question 
Aspect Imitation Non-
imitation 
‘How unpleasant do you think the 
other person found the pain 
stimulation?’ 
Other – 
affective 
3.43 
(1.89) 
3.45 
(1.89) 
‘How intense do you think the 
other person experienced painful 
sensations?’ 
Other – 
sensory 
3.55 
(1.49) 
3.43 
(1.44) 
‘How unpleasant did you find the 
pain stimulation yourself?’ 
Self – 
affective 
2.58 
(1.80) 
2.27 
(1.90) 
‘How intense did you experience 
painful sensations yourself?’ 
Self – 
sensory 
1.30 
(1.91) 
.65  
(2.13) 
 
fMRI results 
 Whole-brain contrasts were computed to examine brain activation 
related to being imitated, and observing someone else in pain (after being 
imitated) in the action and pain perception phase respectively. To this aim, 
we subtracted brain activity in the Nonimitation condition from the Imitation 
condition in the action phase. Furthermore, we calculated Pain – Neutral in 
the pain perception phase to look at the main effect of pain observation. 
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Finally, the interaction was calculated as [(PainImitation) – 
(PainNonimitation) – (NeutralImitation) – (NeutralNonimitation)]. A 
complete list of activations is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: MNI coordinates of whole-brain contrasts. 
 Peak 
coordinates 
Z-
score 
Cluster 
size 
Action phase    
Being imitated – not being imitated    
          Superior temporal sulcus 51, -45, 15 5.62 29 
Pain perception phase    
Pain - neutral    
          Anterior medial cingulate cortex 0, 18, 33 4.21 153 
          Bilateral inferior frontal gyrus 57, 12, 33 6.18 306 
 -57, 9, 36  6.78 192 
          Superior parietal lobe/precuneus 12, -54, 75 9.73 443 
          Amygdala 30, 3, -15 6.58 61 
          Occipital lobe -48, -66, 6 17.50 5437 
(PainImitation – PainNonimitation) – 
(NeutralImitation – NeutralNonimitation) 
   
          Right dorsal anterior insula 30, 15, 6 5.69 63 
          Right temporo-parietal junction 57, -42, 24 5.29 110 
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 In the action phase, the contrast looking at activation for being 
imitated was found in the right superior temporal sulcus (STS; 51, -45, 15, z 
= 5.62; see Figure 1A). 
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Figure 1: Results of the fMRI analysis.  A) Sagittal view of the right STS (51, -45, 
15), active during the action phase for the main effect of imitation. B) Axial view of 
the IFG (57, 12, 33) and coronal view of the aMCC (0, 18, 33), active during the 
pain perception phase for the main effect of pain. C). Coronal view of the right 
dorsal AI (30, 15, 6) and sagittal view of the right TPJ (57, -42, 24), active during 
the pain perception phase for the interaction effect between pain and imitation.  
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 In the pain perception phase, we specifically expected to observe 
activity in areas of the so-called pain matrix (ACC and AI). For the main 
effect of pain, peak activity was found the anterior medial cingulate cortex 
(aMCC; 0, 18, 33, z = 4.21) and in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; 
57, 12, 33, z = 6.18 and -57, 9, 36, z = 6.78; see Figure 1B). Although the 
focus of this activation was not in the AI, activity was found in the right 
ventral AI (43, 29, 7) and bilateral mid insula (42, 0, 16 and -38, 0, 14). For 
the interaction effect, activation was found in the right dorsal AI (30, 15, 6, z 
= 5.69) and the right TPJ (57, -42, 24, z = 5.29; see Figure 1C). Paired T-
tests clearly showed that this activity was due to an increase of percentage 
signal change in the PainImitation condition compared to the 
PainNonimitation condition, t(17) = 3.92, p = .001 and t(17) = 4.25, p = .001 
for the right dorsal AI (see Figure 2A) and the right TPJ (see Figure 2B) 
respectively, while no difference was found between the neutral conditions, 
t(17) = -.14, p > .88 and t(17) = .73, p > .47. Interestingly, in the 
PainImitation condition only, a positive correlation was observed between 
percentage signal change in the right dorsal AI and right TPJ, r = .75, p = 
.001 (after removal of one outlier according to Cook’s distance; see Figure 
3).  
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Figure 2: Percentage signal change analysis for the areas obtained in the interaction 
analysis during the pain perception phase. A) Right dorsal AI (30, 15, 6). B) Right 
TPJ (57, -42, 24). 
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Figure 3: Correlation between percentage signal change in the right dorsal AI and 
right TPJ in the PainImitation condition. 
 
 Additionally, we conducted a percentage signal change analysis for 
areas highlighted in Lamm et al. (2011), where it was found that both for the 
region containing the putamen and AI (extending to inferior frontal gyrus; 
24, 18, 6, z = 4.77; see Figure 4A) and the dorsal AI (39, 12, 15, z = 4.20; 
see Figure 4B) significant differences was observed for the contrast between 
PainImitation and PainNonimitation, t(17) = 3.56, p < .01 and t(17) = 2.42, p 
< .05 respectively.   
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Figure 4: Percentage signal change analysis for areas obtained via Lamm et al. 
(2011). B) The putamen and AI (extending to inferior frontal gyrus; 24, 18, 6). C) 
The dorsal AI (39, 12, 15). 
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DISCUSSION 
 The current fMRI study directly investigated the influence of being 
imitated on empathy for pain. The experiment consisted of an action phase 
where participants were being imitated or not by a hand on screen and a pain 
perception phase where this hand received a painful or non-painful 
stimulation. First, it was observed that during the action phase, being 
imitated compared to not being imitated elicited activation in the right 
posterior STS. During the pain perception phase, a main effect of pain was 
found in the aMCC, confirming previous findings (e.g. Lamm et al., 2011; 
Singer et al., 2004). Finally, the interaction during the pain perception phase 
showed an effect in the right dorsal AI and right TPJ. Percentage signal 
analyses confirmed that this effect was driven by higher activity when 
observing pain after being imitated.  
During the action phase, stronger activity was found in the right 
posterior STS when being imitated compared to not being imitated. This 
region has been shown to be important in action observation (see Grèzes & 
Decety, 2001 for a meta-analysis) and imitation (Iacoboni et al., 2001; 
Molenberghs, Brander, Mattingley, & Cunnington, 2010),  Interestingly, a 
study on reciprocal imitation by Decety, Chaminade, Grèzes, & Meltzoff 
(2002) found activation in the posterior STS not only for imitation but also 
for being imitated. This region has been thought to be related to the mirror 
neuron system (MNS), providing visual representations of observed actions 
that are then transferred to classical mirror areas (Tessari, Canessa, Ukmar, 
Rumiati, 2007). Furthermore, it has been argued that the posterior STS is 
involved in monitoring the congruency between observed and executed 
actions (Miall et al., 2006; Molenberghs et al., 2010). Finally, the posterior 
STS has been strongly linked to perception of biological motion stimuli (e.g. 
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Grossman, Battelli, & Pascual-Leone, 2005; van Kemenade, Muggleton, 
Walsh, & Saygin, 2012). Most likely, the stronger activation in the posterior 
STS when being imitated reflects increased attention to the movement of 
another person when these movements match our own. 
 Importantly, the main effect of pain showed activation in the IFG and 
aMCC, replicating previous research (see Lamm et al., 2011 for a meta-
analysis). Theories suggest that the aMCC plays an important role in 
homeostatic regulation and preparing appropriate responses to painful and 
aversive event (Morrison and Downing, 2007). Activation of the inferior 
frontal cortex has been related to action observation (Van Overwalle and 
Baetens, 2009) as a reflection of action understanding (Rizzolatti, Ferrari, 
Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2006).  Interestingly, our main effect showed no peak 
activation in the AI, although activation of the inferior frontal gyrus seemed 
to be extending to the ventral part of the AI. As suggested by Lamm and 
Singer (2010), ventral and dorsal parts of the AI might serve different 
functions. While the ventral part might play a dominant role in the 
processing of core affective states, the dorsal AI might be more related to 
motor control and homeostatic regulation. This would be in line with the 
current results, suggesting that the main effect of pain activates the ventral 
AI important for affective sharing without strong modulation of self-
relevance. Furthermore, Lamm and Singer (2010) suggest that this part of 
the AI shows strong connections to the amygdala, an area also shown to be 
active in the current experiment. Finally, the main effect of pain showed 
activity in the bilateral mid insula. This part of the insula has been related to 
sensory discrimination, reflecting changes in sensory intensity (Craig, Chen, 
Bandy, & Reiman, 2000; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 
2004; Lin, Hsieh, Yeh, Lee, & Niddam, 2013). Again, this region was not 
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modulated by being imitated, suggesting that this manipulation did not affect 
subdivision of the insula related to sensory processing.  
 Most importantly, when looking at areas specifically activated when 
observing pain after being imitated, the right dorsal part of the AI and the 
right TPJ were found. As mentioned above, the dorsal AI has been related to 
viscero-motor functions, adapting behaviour by translating emotional states 
into action tendencies. This is in line with results shown by De Coster et al. 
(2014) that being imitated elicits a facilitation of motor evoked potentials 
when observing pain, indicating preparation for withdrawal action 
tendencies. Moreover, since we expected being imitated to increase self-
other overlap, we predicted to find activity in the right TPJ, a structure 
related to self-other distinction (Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al., 2009; 
Spengler et al., 2010). A meta-analysis of Sperduti, Delaveau, Fossati, and 
Nadel (2011) links TPJ to externally triggered agency. They suggest that 
activity in this area represents a general mismatch detection mechanism. 
Decety and Lamm (2007) also suggest that the TPJ serves to compare 
internal predictions with external events. The current findings suggest that 
observing pain after being imitated produces greater mismatch between 
internal (self) and external (other) representations. At first sight, it is 
surprising that we found stronger TPJ activity in the being imitated condition 
where the match between the observed and executed movement is high given 
that previous studies found stronger activation in incongruent compared to 
congruent conditions (Brass et al., 2009). However, it is important to note 
that TPJ activation in the current study was found in the pain perception 
phase rather than the action phase. Furthermore, the activation showed up in 
the interaction contrast of (PainImitation – PainNonimitation) – 
(NeutralImitation – NeutralNonimitation), cancelling out motor influences. 
Thus, one reasonable interpretation might be that the right TPJ was involved 
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in distancing oneself from the observed pain (after being imitated) 
specifically. This interpretation would be in line with the strong positive 
correlation found between percentage signal change in the right dorsal AI 
and right TPJ, suggesting that higher AI activation was associated with a 
stronger need for distancing. 
 In sum, the current study shows that being imitated increases reactions 
to observing someone else in pain. Activation in the right dorsal AI 
suggested stronger affective responding after being imitated, while activity 
in the right TPJ indicated a stronger need to distinguish self from other when 
observing someone else in pain. The current results provide a first direct link 
between literature on being imitated and empathy for pain, and support the 
idea that self-other overlap is an important process that combines both.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
THE INFLUENCE OF BEING IMITATED ON EMPATHY 
FOR PAIN IN ADULTS WITH HIGH FUNCTIONING 
AUTISM
1
 
Imitation and empathy skills are thought to be impaired in adults with high 
functioning autism (HFA), and have theoretically been linked to 
dysfunctional shared representational mechanisms. However, research on 
imitation and empathy deficits show conflicting results. In a previous study, 
we have related imitation literature and research on observing others in 
pain in typically developing (TD) adults. It was shown that being imitated 
enhances affective responding to seeing someone else in pain, and we 
provided evidence for the role of shared representations as a core 
underlying mechanism. Behavioural and physiological results in this new 
study showed that overall affective responses while watching pain movies 
were the same, if not higher, in adults with HFA compared to TD. 
Furthermore, TD showed higher affective responding after being imitated 
during the whole experiment, replicating previous studies. Adults with HFA, 
however, showed a reversal of the effect over time: while affective 
responding was lower after being imitated during the first half of the 
experiment, affective responding in the second half of the experiment was 
higher after being imitated. These results suggest dysfunctional control over 
these shared representational systems in adults with HFA.  
                                                     
1
 De Coster, L., Wiersmea, R., Deschrijver, E., & Brass, M. (in preparation). The 
influence of being imitated on empathy for pain in adults with high functioning 
autism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a pervasive neurodevelopmental 
disorder characterized by abnormalities in social communication and 
interaction and restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests, or 
activities (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Thus, 
individuals with ASD often experience difficulties with daily interactions 
and communications, such as interpreting body language, reading facial 
expressions, and understanding others’ thoughts and desires (e.g. Centelles, 
Assaiante, Etchegoyhen, Bouvard, & Schmitz, 2013; Poljac, Poljac, & 
Wagemans, 2013; Senju, 2012). A prominent theory of ASD deficits in 
social cognition is the so-called ‘broken mirror’ hypothesis. This hypothesis 
suggests that deficits in social cognition are the result of a dysfunctional 
mirror neuron system (MNS; Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 2004). This 
hypothesis is based on the idea that we can understand other people’s actions 
and emotions by embodied simulation of their motor and emotional states 
(e.g. Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Brass & Heyes, 2005; Brass, 
Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006; Kaplan & 
Iacoboni, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti  & Sinigaglia, 
2010). According to this hypothesis, ASD should be related to two core 
social-cognitive deficits, namely imitation and empathy.  
 The nature of these abnormalities, however, is still a matter of debate, 
with various contradicting findings dominating the literature. Regarding 
imitation deficits in ASD, early research suggest reduced imitation (for a 
review see Williams et al., 2004). However, other studies have observed no 
imitation deficit (Avikainen, Kulomaki, & Hari, 1999; Bird, Leighton, Press, 
& Heyes, 2007; Dinstein et al., 2010; Ruysschaert, Warreyn, Wiersema, 
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Oostra, & Roeyers, 2014) or even an opposite pattern in ASD, namely 
hyperimitation (Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010). Furthermore, several clinical 
features such as echolalia (unintentionally repeating others’ speech) and 
echopraxia (unintentionally repeating others’ actions) seem to be in line with 
heightened imitation in ASD (Rutter, 1974; Russell, 1997; Williams et al., 
2004). Research on the effects of being imitated in ASD, however, has been 
relatively limited. Studies looking at the effect of being imitated in ASD 
have reported improved social behaviour (Dawson & Adams, 1984; 
Escalona, Field, Nadel, & Lundy, 2002; Field, Field, Sanders, & Nadel, 
2001). Furthermore, it was suggested that imitation is beneficial to children 
with ASD because it creates a feeling of shared understanding between two 
persons (Dawson & Adams, 1984; Nadel & Peze, 1993). As mentioned 
above, the MNS has been thought to be important in action understanding 
and simulation others’ emotional and motor states (Bastiaansen et al., 2009; 
Gazzola et al., 2006; Kaplan & Iacoboni, 2006; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004; Rizzolatti  & Sinigaglia, 2010). Moreover, it is now widely assumed 
that the function of mirror neurons is based on motor simulation of an 
observed action that is mapped onto a corresponding motor representation in 
the observer (for a review see Brass & Heyes, 2005). While the broken-
mirror hypothesis has not made any explicit predictions on deficits in being 
imitated in ASD, a deficit in MNS would predict problems in motor 
simulation and thus altered effect of being imitated. Furthermore, Oberman 
and Ramachandran (2007) postulate that dysfunctional simulation 
mechanisms in ASD might underlie the wide range of social and 
communicative deficits seen in these individuals. 
 Findings on empathy abnormalities in adults with ASD have not been 
straightforward either. Empathy has been defined as ‘the ability to form an 
embodied representation of another’s emotional state, while at the same time 
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being aware of the causal mechanism that induced the emotional state in the 
other’ (Gonzalez-Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory, & Brune, 2013). It has been 
argued to be deficient in adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004). While early research suggested an absence of embodied empathy and 
reduced emotional resonance in adults with ASD (e.g. Minio-Paluello, 
Baron-Cohen, Avenanti, Walsh, & Aglioti, 2009), more recent research 
suggests intact emotional responses to painful observation (e.g. Hadjikhani 
et al., 2014). Furthermore, several studies indicate a distinction between 
abnormalities in cognitive compared to emotional empathy in adults with 
ASD. Cognitive empathy, defined as emotion understanding requiring 
perspective taking and mentalizing, has been closely linked to Theory of 
Mind (ToM). Impairments in ASD concerning ToM and mentalizing have 
been widely reported (see Senju, 2012 for a review). However, emotional 
empathy, consistent of emotional contagion (forming of a representation of 
the other person’s feelings, and thereby sharing of the experience; Gallese & 
Sinigaglia, 2011) and emotional arousal, has been shown to be preserved, if 
not increased in ASD (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007; 
Smith, 2006; Smith, 2009). 
 The aim of the present study is to further investigate whether people 
with ASD have problems in being imitated and empathy. In a recent study, 
De Coster and colleagues (2013) developed a paradigm that showed that 
being imitated increases affective responses to seeing someone else in pain, 
due to increased self-other confusion. In this setup, participants are being 
imitated by a videotaped hand or not (appearing on screen), and the hand on 
screen subsequently receives painful stimulation. Using self-report and 
physiological measures such as startle blink reflex and skin conductance, it 
was observed that being imitated by the hand on screen leads to higher 
reactions to observing that hand in pain. Furthermore, it was shown that the 
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influence of being imitated on empathy for pain was mediated by an increase 
in self-other overlap. In the current study, we used this paradigm to test 
whether these effects are also observed in adults with high functioning 
autism (HFA). This paradigm allows investigating imitation and empathy at 
the same time. First, theoretical accounts that assume that empathy is 
impaired in ASD predict that these individuals should show reduced 
empathy for pain. Furthermore, theories suggesting that adults with ASD 
show hypo-activity in the MNS should predict that being imitated should 
have a reduced influence on empathy for pain since motor simulation and 
self-other merging should be impaired.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
 Twenty adults with HFA and 20 TD controls, aged 21 – 48 years and 
all right-handed, participated in the study in exchange for 20 Euros. Adults 
with HFA (10 F, 10 M) were recruited via the Flemish Autism Association, 
while TD adults (10 F, 10 M) were recruited via the university pool of 
subjects. Adults with HFA were required to have an official clinical 
diagnosis of ASD by a multidisciplinary team. Furthermore, their status as 
‘high-functioning’ was derived from their performance on a standardized 
cognitive assessment using the Kaufman 2 short form of the WAIS-III  (IQ ≥ 
80; see below; Minshew, Turner, & Goldstein, 2005). Both groups did not 
have any additional neurological disorders. The study was granted ethical 
approval by the local ethics committee, and all participants provided written 
consent beforehand. Adults with HFA scored significantly higher than TD 
adults on the Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
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Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Furthermore, all adults with HFA scored above 
the Social Responsiveness Scale for Adults (SRS-A; Constantino et al., 
2003; Bölte, Westerwald, Holtmann, Freitag, & Poustka, 2011) clinical 
threshold, while no TD adults met this criterion.   
Experimental design 
  Blocks of trials consisted of two phases: an action phase in which 
movements of the subjects were imitated (imitation block) or not (non-
imitation block), and a pain perception phase which immediately followed 
the action phase. In the pain perception phase, one of nine pain movies was 
presented (‘bore goes into the hand’, ’hammer is smacked on the hand’, ‘hot 
iron is pressed on the hand’, ‘nail is knocked into the hand with a hammer’, 
‘nail of the ring finger is pulled out of the hand’, ‘paper makes a paper cut 
in the hand’, ‘pinchers pinch the hand’, ‘sandpaper is rubbed over the 
hand’, ‘stapler puts a staple into the hand’). Each pain movie was combined 
two times with both an imitation and non-imitation block, presenting a 
startle probe during the pain movies to elicit the startle blink reflex once 
after each type of block. This resulted in a total of 36 trials: each of the nine 
pain movies was thus combined with both imitative (imitation and non-
imitation) and both startle (startle and no startle) conditions. The association 
of the different pain movies with the different block and startle conditions 
was completely randomized across participants. 
Stimuli and apparatus 
 Stimulus material consisted of three types of 720 x 576 video-clips 
created by professionals: a hand in a resting position, simple finger 
movements (for the action phase of the task), and pain movies showing a 
hand receiving pain stimulation (for the pain movies in the pain perception 
phase).  
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 In the resting state video clip, a right hand with palm down and fingers 
slightly spread was shown, matching the position of the right hand of 
participants placed on the response box. This video remained on screen in 
between presentation of the other videos in order to assure continuous 
observation of a right hand on screen.    
 During the action phase of the experimental task, participants carried 
out simple finger movements of the index, middle, ring, or little finger. 
These finger movements were recorded with a custom-built response device 
using light sensors. This device allowed us to use finger lifting movements 
of participants as triggers for the presentation of the appropriate finger 
movement video. Temporal resolution was optimized (see Procedure) so that 
participants immediately viewed a video-taped finger movement on screen 
after initiating a finger movement with their own hand. For example, in an 
imitation block, the lifting of an index finger resulted in the presentation of 
the index finger lifting video, while the middle, ring, or little finger lifting 
video was shown in a non-imitation block. All finger movement clips had a 
total duration of 2000 ms. 
 The perception phase of the experimental task consisted of the 
presentation of one of nine pain movies in which painful stimulation was 
applied to the hand on screen. All movies had a total duration of 8000 ms. 
Subjective reports 
 During the experiment, four behavioural questions were presented 
after each pain movie, to measure explicit reactions to observing the hand in 
pain: ‘How unpleasant do you think the other person found the pain 
stimulation?’, ‘How intense do you think the other person experienced 
painful sensations?’, ‘How unpleasant did you find the pain stimulation 
yourself?’, ‘How intense did you experience painful sensations yourself?’. 
The first two questions refer to painful experiences of the other person, while 
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the last two questions refer to first person experiences. Both affective 
(unpleasantness) and sensory (intensity) dimensions of pain had to be rated 
on a scale from -5 (not unpleasant/intense at all) to +5 (very 
unpleasant/intense), since research suggests that both dimensions might be 
activated when observing someone else in pain (Bufalari et al., 2007; Cheng, 
Yang, Lin, Lee, & Decety, 2008; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
2007; Loggia, Mogil, & Bushnell, 2008; Keysers, Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). 
Furthermore, a Dutch translation of the scale of Batson, Fultz, and 
Schoenrade (1987) was used, presenting seven items measuring two types of 
emotional responses. These items questioned the subjective feelings of 
participants while viewing painful stimulation, with four items referring to 
self-oriented feelings (personal distress; ‘While viewing the painful 
stimulation of the other person I felt worried/distressed/anxious/sad’), and 
three items referring to other-oriented feelings (concern; ‘While viewing the 
painful stimulation of the other person I felt 
understanding/empathetic/compassionate’). As such, questions referring to 
the observed painful situations could be divided into two categories: self 
(Cronbach’s α for both groups > .90) versus other (Cronbach’s α for both 
groups  > .90). 
Procedure 
  Participants were seated in front of a standard computer screen at arm 
length, and asked to place the four fingers of their right hand on a custom-
made response box. Display of stimulus material and recording of responses 
were conducted with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). 
As soon as the video-taped right hand appeared on screen (resting state 
movie), subjects were instructed to voluntary move a randomly chosen 
finger that was placed on the response box. Immediately after movement of 
one of the subjects’ fingers (delay = 0 ms, estimate of intrinsic delay of 
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computer/software = 66.93 ms), a movie was shown in which the hand on 
screen performed the same or a different movement for imitation and non-
imitation blocks respectively. After 20 movements (all imitative or all non-
imitative), one of the pain movies was immediately presented. After a pain 
movie, participants had to rate the 11 behavioural statements on a scale from 
-5 to +5.  
 During the pain clips, a burst of white noise of  95 dB(A) was 
presented after 4000 ms via headphones in only 50 % of the cases in order to 
avoid predictability of the occurrence of this startle probe (Hawk & Cook, 
2000). Prior to the start of the experiment, the startle noise was presented 
successively five times, in order to control for initial habituation. 
Before the start of the experiment, two practice blocks (one of each 
imitative condition) were presented in order to familiarize subjects with the 
procedure. The pain movie shown in these practice blocks was not used in 
the experimental phase. Furthermore, in these practice blocks, it was verified 
whether participants understood the behavioural questions correctly. More 
specifically, they were explicitly made aware of the distinction between 
other- and self-related questions, and of the fact that the question ‘How 
intense did you experience painful sensations yourself?’ related to self-
experienced painful sensations alone.  
At the end of the experiment, the Kaufman 2 short form of the 
WAIS-III  (Minshew et al., 2005) was conducted in order to measure IQ. 
This short form of the WAIS-III, including the subtests Vocabulary, 
Similarities, Block Design, and Picture Completion, has been shown to be 
adequately predictive for total IQ scores. Furthermore, Minshew et al. (2005) 
have shown that the Kaufman 2 is the most adequate short form for adults 
with ASD. IQ-scores did not differ significantly between both groups (see 
Table 1).  
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Finally, participants were given a set of questionnaires to complete 
at home (with the possibility of requesting help if necessary). This set 
included the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980) as a measure 
of dispositional trait empathy, The Fear of Pain Questionnaire-III (FPQ-III; 
McNeil & Rainwater, 1998) as a measure of fear of experiencing pain in 
different situations, and the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire (PSQ; 
Ruscheweyh, Marziniak, Stumpenhorst, Reinholz, & Knecht, 2009) as a 
measure of sensitivity for painful stimulation. Furthermore, participants 
filled in the Adult Self-Report (ASR; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2003) 
measuring problematic behaviour during the past 6 months, and the Social 
Responsiveness Scale for adults (SRS-A; Constantino, 2005) to measure 
social responsiveness and as an index of ASD severity. Table 1 provides an 
overview with all relevant subtests, details, and Chi-Square or T-test p-
values. 
Electrophysiological recording and analyses 
 Psychophysiological signals were registered with a Biopac MP150 
System and digitalized using AC1001 – AcqKnowledge Software for 
Windows with Electronic Manual (Biopac Systems, Inc.). 
 Startle blink reflex. The startle eye blink reflex was measured 
according to Blumenthal et al.’s guidelines (2005). Two small Ag/AgCL 
electrodes (5 mm) were placed over the orbicularis oculi muscle of the left 
eye, while a ground electrode was placed in the middle of the forehead. The 
raw EMG signal was amplified with a gain of 5000, filtered with a hardware 
band pass filter of 0.5 – 500 Hz, and digitally sampled at 1000 Hz, later 
offline rectified and integrated with PSPHA (De Clercq, Verschuere, De 
Vlieger, & Crombez, 2006). The magnitude of the eye blink amplitude was 
computed as the subtraction of the mean rectified baseline value (0 – 20 ms 
after probe onset) from the rectified peak value in the 21 – 120 ms interval 
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after probe onset. Trials on which baseline values deviated more than 2.5 SD 
from the mean baseline value of the subject were visually inspected, and if 
necessary (e.g., movement artefacts, blink onset before probe onset), 
eliminated. Finally, reflex magnitudes were converted to T-scores across 
trials on a within-participant basis to adjust for between-participant 
differences in response and baseline EMG magnitude (Funayama, Grillon, 
Davis, & Phelps, 2001) as follows: z-score value = (raw magnitude value – 
M all raw values)/SD all raw values; T-score value = (z-score value x 10) + 
50. Z-score values were trimmed (all scores below -3 and above +3 were put 
at -3 and +3 respectively) before they were converted to T-scores.  
 Skin conductance. We measured skin conductance as an index of 
autonomic functioning that has been shown to be responsive to negative 
emotional stimuli (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Skin 
conductance was measured using a constant voltage (0.5 V) and two 
Ag/AgCL electrodes with a diameter of 8 mm. The electrodes were filled 
with conductive gel and were attached on the thenar and hypothenar 
eminences of the left hand. Skin conductance was digitized at 10 Hz for the 
entire duration of the pain movie (8000 ms). Using PSPHA, skin 
conductance responses were calculated as the difference between the highest 
and the lowest value in this 8000 ms time window. In order to normalise the 
data, skin conductance amplitudes were square root transformed prior to 
analysis (Dawson, Schell, & Fillion, 2000).  
Data analysis 
 A .05 significance level was used in all statistical tests. Due to 
equipment failure, one participant was excluded from all 
psychophysiological analyses, and one additional participant was excluded 
for blink modulation data only (both in the HFA group). The two main 
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factors of the analysis were Condition (Imitation versus Non-imitation) and 
Group (HFA versus TD). 
 Interestingly, a recent study by Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, Heacock, 
and Cosby (2012) showed a delayed influence of the rubber hand illusion 
(RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) in children with ASD, showing a RHI only 
in the second block of the experiment (after 6 min of stimulation). This 
illusion, in which a rubber hand feels like one’s own hand when being 
synchronously and simultaneously stroked, comprises of sensory 
manipulation that is also thought to reflect sharing of representations 
between self and other (Tajadura-Jiminez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012). Since it 
was shown that the current paradigm is closely linked to the RHI (De Coster 
et al., 2013), we decided to evaluate whether the influence of being imitated 
on empathy for pain might be delayed for adults with HFA compared to TD 
adults. Furthermore, while conducting the experiment, several adults with 
HFA indicated to have very different feelings during the beginning 
compared to the end of the experiment. Therefore, a factor ‘Block’ was 
included into the analyses, dividing the experiment in two parts (first versus 
last 18 trials). A 2 (Condition: Imitation versus Non-imitation) x 2 (Block: 1 
versus 2) repeated measure ANOVA was conducted with Group (HFA 
versus TD) as between subjects factor for all dependent variables. 
 Finally, correlation analyses were performed between questionnaire 
scores and imitation effects (Imitation – Non-imitation) for both groups 
separately. However, no significant correlations were found for any of the 
dependent variables (all ps > .05). 
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RESULTS 
Subjective reports 
 As mentioned above, all items investigating empathy for pain were 
divided into other- and self-related questions. Both categories were 
subsequently analyzed separately. For other-related items, only a main effect 
of Block, F(1, 38) = 5.07, p < .05, was observed. Scores were higher in the 
first (M = .58, SD = 2.41) compared to the second Block (M = .21, SD = 
2.58) of the experiment. While the interaction with Group was not 
significant, F(1, 38) = 1.67, p > .20, Figure 1 suggests that this decline of 
response scores was mostly present in the HFA group.  
 Analysis of self-related items revealed a significant main effect of 
Condition, F(1, 38) = 5.87, p < .05, indicating higher scores in the Imitation 
(M = .46, SD = 2.47) compared to the Non-imitation condition (M = .34, SD 
= 2.53). Figure 1 suggests that the imitation effect was more pronounced in 
the TD group, although the interaction with Group was not significant, F(1, 
38) = 1.04, p > .30. Furthermore, a two-way interaction between Block and 
Group was observed, F(1, 38) = 4.84, p < .05. As shown in Figure 1, the 
effect of Block was only present in the HFA group, F(1, 19) = 7.33, p < .05, 
with higher scores in the first (M = .63, SD = 2.62) compared to the second 
part (M = -.07, SD = 2.97) of the experiment. This effect was not significant 
in the TD group, F(1, 19) < 1.  
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Figure 1: Mean scores (range from -5 to +5) in the imitation and non-imitation 
condition in the HFA (A, C) and TD group (B, D), for other (A, B)- and self-related 
(C, D) items referring to pain. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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Blink modulation  
 First, no effect of Group was observed, F(1, 36) = 1.54, p > .20, with 
scores of adults with HFA (M = 49.99, SD = 2.20) showing no significant 
difference from scores of TD adults (M = 49.28, SD = 3.67). A significant 
three-way interaction between Group, Condition and Block was found, F(1, 
36) = 4.26, p < .05 (see Figure 3). The two-way interaction between 
Imitation and Block was significant in the HFA group, F(1, 17) = 4.83, p < 
.05, but not in the TD group, F(1, 19) = 1.47, p > .20. In the TD group, a 
significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 19) = 10.07, p < .01, indicated that 
startle magnitudes were always higher in the Imitation (M = 51.38, SD = 
2.97) compared to the Non-imitation (M = 46.97, SD = 0.74) condition. 
However, in the HFA group, startle magnitude was initially lower in the 
Imitation condition, t(17) = -2.10, p < .05, while the reverse was 
numerically, but not statistically, observed in the second Block of the 
experiment, t(17) = 1.32, p = .21 (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Mean blink magnitude in the imitation and non-imitation condition in the 
HFA (A) and TD group (B). Magnitude is expressed as within subjects T-scores, 
error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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Skin conductance 
 No effect of Group was observed, F(1, 37) < 1; M = .38, SD = .48 and 
M = .27, SD = .25 for adults with HFA and TD adults respectively. 
However, a significant three-way interaction between Group, Condition and 
Block was again observed, F(1, 37) = 5.33, p < .05 (see Figure 3). While the 
two-way interaction between Imitation and Block was significant in the HFA 
group, F(1, 18) = 5.22, p < .05, this was not the case in the TD group, F(1, 
19) < 1. A significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 19) = 6.86, p < .05 was 
again observed in the TD group, indicating higher skin conductance 
responses in the Imitation (M = .33, SD = .01) compared to the Non-
imitation (M = .23, SD = .00) condition, irrespective of Block. Although not 
statistically significant, the typical direction of the effect (higher affective 
responses after being imitated) was only observed in the second Block of the 
experiment, t(18) = 1.58, p = .13, numerically even leading to lower 
response after being imitated in the first Block of the experiment, t(18) = -
1.38, p = .19 (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Mean skin conductance in the imitation and non-imitation condition in the 
HFA (A) and TD group (B). Skin conductance responses are expressed as the 
difference between the highest and the lowest value in a specified time window, and 
error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Individuals with ASD often show abnormalities in imitation, empathy, 
and mind-reading abilities. However, the nature and origin of these deficits 
have been debated extensively. The aim of the current study was to 
investigate two questions. First, do individuals with ASD show similar 
empathy for pain than controls? Second, does being imitated have similar 
social consequences in ASD than in healthy controls? Both questions help to 
evaluate different hypotheses about the role of the MNS in ASD. One the 
one hand, it has been argued that ASD is related to impairments in the MNS. 
If this would hold true, it would suggest that ASD should show less empathy 
for pain and should be less influenced by being imitated since simulation of 
emotional and motor states would be deficient. In the current study, we used 
a recently validated paradigm, in which reactions to observing someone else 
in pain are heightened after being imitated compared to not being imitated 
(De Coster et al., 2013). A group of HFA and matched TD adults observed a 
hand on screen in pain subsequent to being imitated by this hand on screen 
or not. First, ASD showed similar affective responses to seeing someone else 
in pain as TD, indicating that no general deficit in empathy for pain was 
present. Second, while the pattern of TD adults replicated previous findings 
showing higher empathy for pain after being imitated, adults with HFA 
showed a distinct pattern of results. Startle blink magnitude and skin 
conductance, as measures of autonomous nervous functioning, revealed that 
the influence of being imitated compared to not being imitated on empathy 
for pain for HFA changed over time. A significant two-way interaction 
between Block (first and second part of the experiment) and Condition 
(Imitation versus Non-imitation) showed that affective reactions to 
observing the hand on screen for adults with HFA were lower after being 
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imitated in the first part of the experiment, while data in the last part of the 
experiment mimicked results found for TD adults (higher empathy for pain 
after being imitated). Furthermore, while subjective reports on self-related 
items were higher in the imitation compared to the non-imitation condition 
for both groups, scores decreased significantly for adults with HFA only. 
 Our study clearly suggests that adults with HFA display empathy for 
pain when observing someone else in pain. Both for explicit (self-reports) 
and implicit (startle magnitude, skin conductance) measures, no effect of 
group was observed, indicating that both ASD and TD showed equal 
affective responses when observing someone else in pain. This is in line with 
recent studies showing equal empathic responding in ASD compared to TD 
(Hadjikhani et al., 2014, Rogers et al., 2007; Smith, 2006; Smith, 2009). 
Hadjikhani et al. (2014), for example, showed activation of the pain matrix 
(common areas thought to be active both when experiencing and observing 
pain, most notably the anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula; Singer et 
al., 2004) for a group of subject with ASD and a group of matched control 
individuals. They concluded that perception-action mechanisms are operant 
in both ASD and TD, showing that mirror mechanisms and shared 
representations can be spontaneously elicited in ASD when observing 
someone else in pain. The current study adds to these findings, showing that 
being imitated has an influence on empathy for pain in HFA, although the 
pattern of this influence is different over time for HFA compared to TD. 
While adults with HFA responded paradoxically to the imitation 
manipulation in the first block of the experiment, showing reduced influence 
in the imitation compared to the non-imitation condition, the second block 
showed a typical influence of being imitated on empathy for pain that was 
similar to that of TD adults. Thus, the current results suggest a delayed 
influence of being imitated on empathy for pain, reminiscent of the results of 
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Cascio et al. (2012), who showed that the RHI in children with ASD was 
also delayed. These results are in contrast with previously reported lack of 
empathy and imitation abilities in ASD and the broken mirror theory 
suggesting that empathic and motor simulation is impossible in ASD due to 
a deficient MNS (Williams et al., 2004) since this account would predict no 
empathic response or influence of being imitated. Importantly, our implicit 
results in the first block of the experiment (statistically for the startle 
magnitude, numerically for skin conductance) indicate a reversed influence 
of being imitated on empathy for pain in adults with ASD. This shows that 
they were sensitive to the imitation manipulation, albeit in an opposite 
manner. The most plausible interpretation for this finding is that this is due 
to a compensatory mechanism elicited by reduced control over self-other 
overlap in ASD.  
 Recent studies suggest that it is not self-other merging, but rather the 
control of this merging that is deficient in ASD, linking this process to the 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; 
Spengler et al., 2010; see also Hamilton, 2013). Spengler et al. (2010) 
suggested that individuals with ASD suffer from heightened rather than 
decreased self-other merging, resulting in hyperimitation related to social 
cognitive skills. As shown in a previous study (De Coster et al., 2013), the 
influence of being imitated on empathy for pain in the current paradigm is 
mediated by a self-other confusion mechanism. As such, the idea is that 
ASD show abnormal increase of this self-other merging, especially in the 
first part of the experiment due to the novelty of the presented stimuli. In this 
respect, Pellicano and Burr (2012) and van Boxtel and Lu (2013) posit, for 
example, that people with ASD are overloaded with sensory information 
accompanying new situations. To cope with this sensation, coping 
mechanisms might initially make it seem as if being imitated has a reversed 
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influence on empathy for pain for ASD. Indeed, several subjects reported 
exactly this strategy when conducting the experiment (e.g. trying to avert 
attention from stimuli, reminding oneself that the painful sensation was not 
real). Moreover, ratings on subjective self-reports after observing the hand in 
pain decreased over the course of the experiment, which might indicate 
habituation over the time, gradually eliminating the need for coping. 
Interestingly, recent studies by Paton, Hohwy, and Enticott (2012) and 
Palmer, Paton, Hohwy, and Enticott (2013) showed that individuals with 
ASD or individuals scoring high on the nonclinical autism spectrum reported 
a RHI experience, but discrepancies compared to a control group in sensory 
and visuotactile-proprioceptive integration were found. These results were 
also related to different expectancies regarding sensory events in uncertain 
contexts for ASD, supporting the idea of hypersensitivity in ASD to novel 
sensory stimuli (such as pain). Thus, research is needed to explore the idea 
that self-other merging mechanisms change over time in adults with ASD. 
As mentioned above, studies by Paton et al. (2012) and Palmer et al. (2013) 
showed differences in the RHI for ASD/nonclinical autism spectrum and 
control groups. Cascio et al. (2012), however, showed that ASD show a 
delayed influence of the RHI, suggesting that a sense of body ownership and 
differentiation of self from other varies over time. Additionally, the role of 
the TPJ (and MNS) regarding this shift over time should be further 
investigated. While the study by Hadjikhani et al., (2014) suggests no 
different activation in these regions between ASD and TD when observing 
pain, current results suggest that it might be important to look at the time 
course of these activations. Importantly, research has related ASD to TPJ 
functioning (Lombardo, Chakrabarti, Bullmore, MRC AIMS Consortium, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2011). As such, it would be interesting to explore whether 
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TPJ and/or mPFC activation changes over time in the current experiment for 
adults with ASD.  
 Interestingly, literature suggests an important difference between 
actual and reported empathic sensations in ASD (Bird & Cook, 2013), and a 
dissociation between emotional/implicit and cognitive/explicit empathy 
(Smith, 2009). Bird and Cook (2013), for example, suggest that emotional 
impairments associated with ASD are due to alexithymia – a condition 
characterized by a reduced ability to identify and describe one’s emotional 
responses, frequently co-occurring with ASD – rather than ASD itself. 
Furthermore, a study by Fan, Chen, Chen, Decety, & Cheng (2013) has 
shown that while individuals with ASD show mu suppression and empathic 
arousal when confronted with other’s pain, they display difficulties in 
responding adequately to other’s distress. In light of these discrepancies, part 
of our subjective explicit results can also be interpreted. Self-related items, 
measuring self-experienced feelings when observing the hand in pain, 
showed a general effect of being imitated, without interaction with group or 
block (although a general decline over blocks was observed for HFA only). 
This does not correspond to the fact that for physiological measures, people 
with ASD showed an opposite direction of the imitation effect in early trials, 
suggesting a discrepancy between explicit and implicit responses in the 
current study. Taken together, these results might reflect the above 
mentioned inconsistencies between explicit and implicit empathy (e.g. 
Smith, 2009). However, previous research suggests that ASD have problems 
with explicit/cognitive rather than implicit/emotional (Scharzkopf, 
Schilbach, Vogeley, & Timmermans, 2014; Smith, 2009) measures of 
empathy. Schwarzkopf et al (2014), for example, have shown that adults 
with ASD have problems with intentional, explicit perspective taking, while 
they engage normally in spontaneous perspective taking. This seems in 
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contrast with the current results where ratings on self-related items were 
higher after being imitated for both the TD and ASD group. However, as 
mentioned above, participants in the current study were clearly aware of the 
difficulties they experienced when confronted with the painful stimulation 
after being imitated. Thus, it seems plausible that they rated self-related 
items accordingly and an effect of being imitated was observed, while 
implicit measures elicited a more unconscious compensatory mechanism. 
Furthermore, De Coster et al. (2013) have showed that for TD adults, no 
correlation between explicit and implicit measures was found in the current 
paradigm, supporting the idea that different processes might modulate 
explicit and implicit responses differently. Further research is needed, 
however, to investigate this and examine modulating factors of the 
imbalance between explicit and implicit forms of empathy in ASD.  
 Finally, it has to be noted that our skin conductance results seem to 
suggest that it is the non-imitation condition that changes over the course of 
the experiment for adults with ASD, and that variability in this condition is 
large. While this also suggests that the control over self-other merging is 
deficient in ASD, the difference between being imitated and not being 
imitated has to be investigated more thoroughly, as well as the discrepancy 
between both our physiological measures. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In the current thesis, we investigated whether being imitated increases 
reactions to observing someone else in pain. To this aim, we developed a 
paradigm in which subjects’ finger movements are being imitated by a hand 
on screen or not. Subsequently, the hand on screen receives painful 
stimulation.  
 
A MULTI-METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INVESTIGATE THE 
INFLUENCE OF BEING IMITATED ON EMPATHY FOR PAIN 
 
 In four different studies using four different methodologies, we 
replicated the finding that being imitated modulates empathy for pain, and 
investigated the mechanism underlying this effect. In Chapter 2, we aimed 
to provide first evidence for the idea that being imitated increases affective 
responses to seeing someone else in pain using explicit behavioural and 
implicit psychophysiological measures. Furthermore, we wanted to explore a 
potential mechanism underlying this effect, with a focus on self-other 
overlap. In this study, both explicit and implicit responses demonstrated 
stronger reactions when observing another person in pain after being 
imitated. Moreover, by linking our paradigm to rubber hand illusion (RHI) 
setups we were able to show that this effect was mediated by self-other 
merging processes. Thus, this study established our paradigm as a valuable 
tool to investigate our research question, and provided important first 
insights into the effect.  
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 In a transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study (Chapter 3) 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were induced in the first dorsal interroseus 
(FDI) of the right hand when observing pain after being imitated. This way, 
we aimed to investigate whether being imitated not only affects automatic 
emotional responses, but whether it also has an effect on specific action 
tendencies, testing how far the consequences of being imitated on empathy 
for pain extended. We were able to show that our imitation manipulation had 
different effects on bodily action tendencies. While not being imitated 
induced a decrease of corticospinal excitability (CSE; in accordance with 
previous literature; e.g. Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; Avenanti, 
Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006), being imitated resulted in an 
increase of CSE. These findings were able to account for previously 
observed contradicting findings (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & 
Aglioti, 2009; Fitzgibbon et al., 2012), by positing that CSE changes when 
observing someone else in pain are dependent upon the control participants 
can exert over the pain they see. When not exerting control (not being 
imitated), the most adaptive response is to show an anaesthetic inhibition 
response, while exerting control (being imitated) provides the opportunity to 
prepare for a withdrawal response. As such, with this TMS study we 
demonstrated that our imitation manipulation can influence action tendencies 
in a specific manner, providing important insight into existing discrepancies 
in the literature, and showing the power of our manipulation. 
 In Chapter 4, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was 
used to directly examine which brain areas become more active when 
observing someone else in pain after being imitated. More specifically, we 
wanted to investigate which parts of the pain matrix (affective or sensory; 
see Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 2004) are influenced by 
being imitated. Moreover, this study allowed to provide first neural evidence 
GENERAL DISCUSSION     147 
for the idea that self-other overlap underlies the effect of being imitated on 
empathy for pain, by looking at modulation of neural structures related to 
self-other merging by our imitation manipulation. When looking at 
activation during observation of pain after being imitated, peak activity was 
found in the dorsal anterior insula (AI) and right temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ). These activations were interpreted as reflecting heightened affective 
states (Lamm et al., 2011) and self-other overlap (Brass, Zysset, & von 
Cramon, 2001; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 
2010) respectively. Furthermore, since the dorsal AI has been related to 
motor control and translation of emotional states into action tendencies 
(Lamm & Singer, 2010), these results were complementary to our TMS 
study that showed specific action tendencies when being imitated. With this 
fMRI experiment we were thus able to provide compelling neural evidence 
for the idea that being imitated increases activation in specific areas of the 
pain matrix when observing pain, and support the idea that self-other 
confusion plays an important role.  
 Finally, in Chapter 5 the aforementioned paradigm was applied to 
adults with high functioning autism (HFA). A large number of studies 
suggest deficiencies in imitation and empathy abilities, although consensus 
on these deficiencies seems difficult to reach (e.g. Williams, Whiten, & 
Sing, 2004 versus Spengler et al., 2010 for imitation and Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004 versus Hadjikhani et al., 2014 for empathy). Since the 
current paradigm encompasses both processes, our paradigm provided us 
with a valuable tool to gain more insight into these findings by investigating 
whether and how the effect of being imitated on empathy for pain is different 
in adults with HFA. First, no overall empathy differences between HFA and 
typically developing (TD) adults were observed (on implicit and explicit 
measures). However, the influence of being imitated on empathy for pain in 
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HFA seemed to show a different pattern than that of TD. In the beginning of 
the experiment, lower affective responses after being imitated were 
observed, while higher affective responding was observed at the end of the 
experiment (replicating findings of TD adults). Importantly, this study 
showed that individuals with HFA are able to show empathy, and that being 
imitated can influence this empathic response, albeit in a different manner 
from that of TD controls. Rather than supporting a dysfunctional MNS 
hypothesis (Williams et al., 2004), these findings were interpreted as 
evidence for a deficit in the control of merging between self and other in 
ASD (Spengler et al., 2010; see also Hamilton, 2013).  
 
SELF-OTHER CONFUSION AND THE INFLUENCE OF BEING IMITATED 
ON EMPATHY FOR PAIN 
 
Thus, in four studies we were able to provide compelling evidence 
for the idea that being imitated influences observing someone else in pain. A 
second aim of this thesis comprised of investigating the process underlying 
this effect. Research has suggested that imitation is based on a mechanism 
that directly matches the observed action onto a corresponding motor 
representation in the observer (motor simulation; Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Iacoboni et al., 1999). Furthermore, a similar process seems to take place for 
emotions and affective states, suggesting embodied simulation (Bastiaansen, 
Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Heberlein & Atkinson, 2009). More specifically, 
research on empathy for pain indicates that observed and experienced pain 
share neural structures (Singer et al., 2004, for a meta-analysis see Lamm et 
al., 2011). Thus, both imitation and empathy for pain have been linked to 
sharing of representations between self and other, although they have – thus 
far – not been related to one another. In the current thesis, however, we have 
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repeatedly found evidence for the idea that being imitated increases self-
other confusion and as a result leads to higher empathy for pain. In the first 
study, we linked our paradigm to RHI setups (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) by 
creating a setup that resembles an action induced RHI (Dummer, Picot-
Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009), and showing that the influence of being 
imitated on empathy or pain is mediated by this illusion. Since this paradigm 
has also been strongly linked to sharing of representations between self and 
other (Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012), this study provided the 
first evidence for the idea that self-other overlap underlies the effect of being 
imitated on empathy for pain. Furthermore, our TMS study indicated that the 
imitation manipulation modulated action tendencies when observing 
someone else in pain, suggesting that the self is strongly affected. Being 
imitated led to an increase of CSE when observing pain, suggesting 
preparation for withdrawal. Such a withdrawal only makes sense if 
confusion between self and other takes place, since own bodily reactions are 
affected. Importantly, our fMRI study was the first to explicitly show 
involvement of the TPJ (a region linked to self-other overlap; Brass et al., 
2001; Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2010) in the paradigm, providing a 
first direct indication for the involvement of self-other merging as an 
important process. Moreover, our study with adults with HFA suggested that 
being imitated has an effect on empathy for pain, albeit in a different manner 
for HFA compared to TD adults, suggesting deficiencies with the self-other 
overlap process underlying the effect. More specifically, the reversal of 
effects over time indicated that a deficient control over this self-other 
merging was responsible for the effects found in HFA. Finally, it has to be 
noted that – due to the randomization of the imitative and non-imitative 
blocks in the setup – we demonstrated that being imitated influences 
empathy for pain on a trial-by-trial basis, which seems at odds with an 
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account that would assume that being imitated induces a general prosocial 
liking (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg).Thus, all these 
data support the idea that self-other confusion plays an important role in the 
current paradigm rather than a mere abstract affiliation with the other person, 
providing insights into mechanisms possibly important in other social 
interactions. However, an essential question that comes to mind when having 
a close look at the paradigm and assuming self-other confusion is whether 
the current thesis genuinely investigates ‘being imitated’ rather than exerting 
control over an observed hand. There are several important differences 
between the current paradigm and social-psychological research on being 
imitated. Due to the absence of a delay between executed and observed 
movements, the basic simplicity of these movements, and the usage of a first 
person perspective, the imitative versus non-imitative situation was 
immediately transparent to participants. While this was explicitly done in 
order to increase self-other overlap, this limits the ecological validity of the 
effects. Social-psychological research has indicated, for example, that 
complex prosocial effects of being imitated only take place when subjects 
are unaware of the imitative situation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren 
et al., 2004). Thus, it is not straightforward that more complex social 
situations operate in a similar fashion, although it seems peculiar that self-
other confusion would not extent its influence to these situations as well. 
 
EMPATHY FOR PAIN VERSUS EMOTIONAL CONTAGION? 
 
 Another important question arises when assuming that confusion 
between self and other is the core mechanism responsible for our effects. 
While empathy has been defined as’ the ability to share the affective 
experiences of others’ (Singer & Lamm, 2009), literature suggest that this 
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empathic response requires the ability to experience feelings of the other 
person while at the same time being able to recognize this person as different 
from the self (see Singer and Lamm, 2009 for an overview of terminology). 
As such, it is disputable whether the term ‘empathy for pain’ is still 
applicable to the current paradigm. As shown in the first behavioural study, 
we demonstrated that indices of the RHI such as agency, control and body 
ownership were higher in the imitation condition. As a matter of fact, it was 
exactly this assumption that allowed us to conduct the TMS study, which 
showed that our imitation manipulation had strong implications for the self 
(modulating bodily action tendencies). Furthermore, our fMRI study clearly 
indicated activity in the TPJ, a region strongly linked to self-other distinction 
(Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2010),  during empathy 
for pain after being imitated. This suggest a stronger need for distinction in 
this situation and again indicates a reduction of boundaries between self and 
other. It is therefore an open question whether it is empathy or rather agency 
mechanisms that allow us to share emotions in the current paradigm. 
Ehrsson, Wiech, Welskopf, Dolan, & Passingham (2007), for example, have 
demonstrated that threatening a rubber hand that feels as if it is your own 
hand increases brain activity in pain-related brain areas such as the ACC and 
AI. Thus, our paradigm – strongly linked to the RHI as well – activates 
similar neural structures as observed when conducting RHI experiments. 
However, although all implicit results strongly indicate that a self-other 
confusion mechanism takes place, it cannot be excluded that other processes 
are present as well. Ratings on our behavioural self-report questions 
suggested that people still consciously seem to distinguish self from other. 
Responses to other- and self-related questions were differently rated, with 
higher scores on other-related than on self-related subjective judgments. This 
suggests that self-other confusion was not complete, since a clear distinction 
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between self and other still seemed obvious to participants. We therefore 
opted to use the term empathy for pain throughout the thesis nevertheless, 
although it should be noted that this term might not encompass the whole 
process. The question remains whether reactions in the current paradigm 
were about the other (empathy for pain) or about the self (emotional 
contagion).  
 
 IMPLICIT VERSUS EXPLICIT MEASURES OF EMPATHY FOR PAIN 
 
 Another important aspect of the current paradigm is the apparent 
absence of any relationship between explicit and implicit measures. In all 
four studies, no correlation between explicit (self-reports) and implicit 
(psychophysiology, MEPs, brain activation) responses was observed. 
However, this need not be surprising, since several accounts suggest a 
dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy (Hynes, Baird, & 
Grafton, 2006; Schulte-Ruther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007; 
Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009; Vollm et al., 2006). 
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2009) suggest that the inferial frontal gyrus (IFG) 
structure is necessary for affective empathy, while the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is responsible for cognitive empathy. While the 
affective system is related to the mirror neuron system (MNS), the cognitive 
system is thought to be more related to theory of mind (TOM) and 
mentalizing abilities. The relationship between these two forms of empathy, 
however, and their possible interaction is still a matter of debate. Thus, if our 
explicit measures would tap into the cognitive system while implicit 
measures activate the emotional system, the link between both responses 
remains to be investigated. The first behavioural study, the TMS and fMRI 
study all show similar effects for explicit and implicit measures, suggesting 
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at least a partial overlap and possible presence of similar underlying 
mechanisms. However, the study with adults with HFA showed a distinction 
when looking at effects of being imitated on explicit versus implicit 
responses for HFA, suggesting that a clear dissociation is present as well. 
One possibility would be that both measures tap into the different 
mechanisms mentioned above. Thus, explicit responses might be more 
related to abstract empathy and increased liking, since behavioural self-
reports suggested that self from other were still clearly distinguishable. 
Implicit measures, on the other hand, might be more prone to self-other 
confusion. An interesting follow-up would be to investigate whether explicit 
prosocial rating generalize to other people not involved in the initial 
interaction (see e.g. van Baaren et al., 2004), while implicit responses are 
focused on the direct interaction partner with whom self-other overlap takes 
place.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 In sum, in a series of four studies, we have shown that being imitated 
increases reactions to observing someone else in pain. Providing evidence 
for a shared representational account underlying these effects, we 
demonstrate that a basic mechanism allows for the interaction between the 
motor system serving imitation and the sensory system responsible for 
simulating observed pain. A few important questions, however, remain 
unanswered. As mentioned above, an important issue is whether the current 
paradigm investigates control rather than being imitated, and which 
similarities or discrepancies with the RHI are present. Thus, it is necessary to 
explore whether more ecologically valid social imitation interactions operate 
in similar ways. More specifically, it would be interesting to investigate 
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whether self-other overlap is an important process in more complex social 
situations as well. Thus, it is clear that our operationalization of being 
imitated shows discrepancies with daily social interactions in naturalistic 
environments. Related to this, the temporal contingency that is present in 
both experimental conditions in our setup (being imitated and not being 
imitated) also forces us to think whether the current paradigm was more 
about contingency rather than imitation. Creating a setup in which 
contingency and imitation are dissociated would  be highly interesting since 
it would allow us to look at situations in which complete control is present 
without being imitated, and possibly distinguish positive effects of being 
imitated from negative effects of not being imitated. Although all these 
setup-related limitations are recognized, we nevertheless believe that the 
current thesis has provided important understanding into social (imitative) 
interactions and observation of others in pain, combining two fields of study 
that were previously unrelated.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 Imitatie is een belangrijk aspect van ons dagelijks leven. Onderzoek 
heeft aangetoond dat imitatie over, automatisch en zelfs tussen totale 
vreemden plaatsvindt (Brass, Bekkering, Wöhlschlager, & Prinz, 2000; 
Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003). Chartrand en Bargh (1999) toonden met het ‘Chameleon 
effect’ aan dat mimicry (non-intentionele, automatische imitatie) een invloed 
heeft op hoe we met anderen omgaan en anderen percipiëren: we vinden 
iemand die ons imiteert leuker en de interactie met deze persoon verloopt 
vlotter. Een brede waaier aan sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek heeft 
sindsdien aangetoond dat geïmiteerd worden allerlei positieve sociale 
gevolgen met zich meebrengt, van meer helpgedrag en generositeit naar de 
imitator tot een algemene prosociale oriëntatie (e.g. Kühn et al., 2010; Lakin, 
Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Stel, van Baaren, & Vonk, 2008; van Baaren, 
Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). Imitatie blijkt dus een 
essentieel proces te zijn dat relaties tussen individuen versterkt. Alhoewel al 
meermaals is aangetoond dat imitatie een invloed heeft op complexe sociale 
gedragingen is nog nooit onderzocht of geïmiteerd worden ook meer basale 
en automatische processen, zoals het observeren van anderen in pijn, kan 
beïnvloeden. 
Singer et al. (2004) toonden voor het eerst aan dat het observeren 
van anderen in pijn gelijkaardige breinregio’s activeert als wanneer personen 
zelf pijn ervaren (empathie voor pijn). Verschillende studies demonstreerden 
dat hierbij vooral de affectief-motivationele dimensies van pijn geactiveerd 
worden (Goubert, Vervoort, & Craig, 2012; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
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2005; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer et al., 2006), alhoewel steeds 
meer evidentie gevonden wordt voor de idee dat ook sensorische dimensies 
actief worden (Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007; 
Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, & Decety, 2008; Lamm, Nusbaum, Meltzoff, & 
Decety, 2007; Loggia, Mogil, & Bushnell, 2008; for a review see Keysers, 
Kaas, & Gazzola, 2010). Een meta-analyse van Lamm et al. (2011) 
demonstreerde dat vooral de anterieure insula (AI) en anterieur cingulate 
cortex (ACC) consistent geactiveerd worden bij pijnobservatie. Verder 
toonden verschillende studies reeds aan dat empathie voor pijn gemoduleerd 
kan worden door cognitieve top-down (e.g. Cheng et al., 2007; Decety, 
Echols, & Corell, 2009; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 
2008; Lamm, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2010; Singer et al., 2006) en bottom-up 
invloeden (e.g. Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han, 2009; 
Yang, Decety, Lee, Chen, & Cheng, 2009). De invloed van geïmiteerd 
worden op empathie voor pijn is echter – tot nu toe – nog nooit onderzocht.  
 
DOELEN VAN HET ONDERZOEK 
 
Het doel van de huidige thesis was om na te gaan of geïmiteerd 
worden reacties op het zien van anderen in pijn kan moduleren. Aangezien 
geïmiteerd worden prosociaal gedrag verhoogt (e.g. Kühn et al., 2010; Lakin 
et al., 2008; van Baaren et al., 2004) lijkt het intuïtief dat ook responsen op 
het observeren van anderen in pijn verhoogd zouden worden door imitatie. 
Verder wouden we in de huidige thesis eveneens onderzoeken welk(e) 
mechanisme(n) onderliggend zijn aan het effect van imitatie op empathie 
voor pijn. De focus lag hierbij op de theorie die veronderstelt dat gedeelde 
representaties tussen het zelf en de ander de invloed van geïmiteerd worden 
op empathie voor pijn mediëren. Zowel imitatie (Brass & Heyes, 2005) als 
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empathie voor pijn (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers, 2009; Heberlein & 
Atkinson, 2009) werden voorheen gelinkt aan dit idee van gedeelde 
representaties, maar beiden werden nog niet met elkaar verbonden. 
Dergelijke link zou belangrijke inzichten kunnen verschaffen in de 
samenwerking tussen het motorische systeem dat instaat voor imitatie en het 
sensorische systeem dat verantwoordelijk is voor empathie voor pijn. De 
voorspelling van de huidige thesis was bijgevolg dat geïmiteerd worden zelf-
ander overlap zou verhogen aangezien eigen en andermans acties in een 
gemeenschappelijk domein gecodeerd worden (e.g. Brass, Derrfuss, 
Cramon, & von Cramon, 2003; Liepelt, von Cramon, & Brass, 2008). Deze 
verhoogde zelf-anderverwarring zou bijgevolg voor verhoogde reacties op 
het zien van anderen in pijn moeten leiden.  
Om te onderzoeken of geïmiteerd worden empathie voor pijn 
verhoogt, ontwikkelden we een paradigma dat beide aspecten combineerde. 
In dit paradigma zitten participanten voor een computerscherm waarbij ze – 
willkeurige en zelf gekozen – eenvoudige vingerbewegingen moeten maken. 
Tegelijkertijd wordt een hand op het scherm geobserveerd die deze 
bewegingen ofwel imiteert, ofwel niet imiteert. Na een aantal van deze 
bewegingen (allemaal imitatie of niet-imitatie) wordt geobserveerd hoe de 
hand op het scherm pijnlijke stimulatie wordt toegediend. Tijdens en na deze 
pijnobservatie werden respectievelijk impliciete en expliciete reacties 
gemeten en werd nagegaan of geïmteerd worden deze responsen kon 
moduleren.  
In een reeks van vier studies, gebruikmakend van vier verschillende 
methodologieën, werd dit paradigma gebruikt om ne te gaan of geïmiteerd 
worden empathie voor pijn verhoogt. In een eerste gedragsstudie werden 
zelfrapportage en psychofysiologie gebruikt om voor de eerste keer te 
onderzoeken wat gebeurt bij het observeren van pijn na imitatie. Deze studie 
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was de eerste demonstratie van de invloed van geïmiteerd worden op 
empathie voor pijn en zorgde bovendien voor de eerste evidentie dat een 
zelf-anderverwarringsmechanisme deze effecten moduleerde. Verder toonde 
deze studie ook aan dat het paradigma een waardevol instrument was om 
onze onderzoeksvraag verder te onderzoeken. In een tweede studie werden 
motor evoked potentialen (MEPn) uitgelokt via transcraniële magnetische 
stimulatie (TMS) om na te gaan of geïmiteerd worden ook actietendensen 
kan beïnvloeden. In een derde studie werd functionele magnetische 
beeldvorming gebruikt (fMRI) aangezien zo voor het eerst direct kon 
worden onderzocht of imitatie inderdaad tot verhoogde pijngerelateerde 
activatie leidt. Tot slot werd een studie uitgevoerd met volwassenen met 
hoogfunctionerend autisme (HFA). Hier werd nagegaan of de invloed van 
geïmiteerd worden op empathie voor pijn gelijkaardig is voor deze 
individuen wanneer hun reacties vergeleken werden met typisch 
ontwikkelende (TO) volwassenen.  
 
EEN BEKNOPT OVERZICHT VAN DE BELANGRIJKSTE BEVINDINGEN 
 
 In Hoofdstuk 2 werd gebruik gemaakt van expliciete zelfrapportage 
en impliciete psychofyiologische responsen en werd aangetoond dat 
geïmiteerd worden affectieve reacties op het observeren van anderen in pijn 
verhoogt. Zowel expliciete als impliciete reacties waren sterker bij 
pijnperceptie na imitatie. Verder werd ook gedemonstreerd dat zelf-
anderoverlap onderliggend is aan dit effect door het paradigma te linken aan 
de rubberen handillusie (RHI; een illusie waarbij een rubberen hand als de 
eigen hand wordt gepercipieed wanneer eigen en rubberen hand simultaan 
aangeraakt worden; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Deze studie bevestigde dat 
het huidige paradigma gebruikt kon worden om onze onderzoeksvraag 
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verder te onderzoeken en genereerde belangrijke inzichten in het effect en 
het onderliggende mechanisme.  
 In Hoofstuk 3 werd een TMS studie beschreven waarbij MEPn 
geïnduceerd werden in de rechterhand van proefpersonen terwijl de hand op 
het scherm in pijn werd geobserveed. Op deze manier kon worden nagegaan 
of imitatie niet enkele affectieve automatische responsen beïnvloedt, maar 
ook specifieke actietendensen kan moduleren. In dit experiment werd 
aangetoond dat geïmiteerd worden inderdaad een effect heeft op dergelijke 
actietendsen. Terwijl niet geïmiteerd worden zorgt voor een daling in 
corticospinale excitabiliteit (CSE; Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, & Aglioti, 2005; 
Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2006), zorgt geïmiteerd 
worden voor een stijging in CSE (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari, & 
Aglioti, 2009; Fitzgibbon et al., 2012). Deze resultaten waren in staat om 
tegenstrijdige bevindingen in de literatuur te verklaren, door ervan uit te 
gaan dat CSE veranderingen bij het obsveren van pijn afhankelijk zijn van 
de controle die men uitoefent over de hand in pijn. Wanneer geen controle 
aanwezig is (niet-imitatie), is een anaesthetische inhibitie de meest adaptieve 
respons, terwijl controle (imitatie) toelaat om het lichaam voor te bereiden 
op een terugtrekrespons. Deze TMS studie toonde bijgevolg aan dat onze 
imitatiemanipulatie verreikende consequenties had, aangezien 
actietendensen op een specifieke manier werden beïnvloed. Verder werden 
ook belangrijke inzichten verworven in bestaande discrepanties in de 
literatuur.  
 In Hoofdstuk 4 werd gebruik gemaakt van fMRI om op een directe 
manier te onderzoeken welke breinregio’s meer geactiveerd worden wanneer 
anderen in pijn worden geobserveerd na imitatie. We wouden specifiek 
nagaan welke delen van de pijnmatrix (affectief of sensorisch; zie Lamm et 
al., 2011; Singer et al., 2004) beïnvloed werden door onze 
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imitatiemanipulatie. Via deze studie was het ook mogelijk om neurale 
evidentie te bieden voor de idee dat zelf-anderoverlap een belangrijke rol 
speelt in huidg paradigma door na te gaan of regio’s gelinkt aan zelf-
anderverwarring gemoduleerd werden door de imitatiemanipulatie. Wanneer 
pijn werd geobserveed na imitatie, werd in huidige studie verhoogde 
activatie gevonden in de dorsale AI en rechtse temporo-pariëtale junctie 
(TPJ). Deze activaties werden geïnterpreteerd als verhoogde affectiviteit 
(Lamm et al., 2011) en zelf-ander distinctie (Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 
2001; Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, Bird, & Brass, 2010) 
respectievelijk. Met deze fMRI studie werd bijgevolg overtuigende evidentie 
geboden voor de idee dat geïmiteerd worden pijngerelateerde activatie 
verhoogt bij het observeren van anderen in pijn en voor de idee dat zelf-
anderoverlap een belangrijke rol speelt.  
 Tot slot werd in Hoofdstuk 5 het paradigma toegepast bij 
volwassenen met HFA. Verschillende studies toonden aan dat 
autismespectrumstoornissen (ASS) gepaard gaan met imitatie- en 
empathieproblemen. Er bestaat echter geen consensus omtrent de aard van 
deze problemen (e.g. Williams, Whiten, & Sing, 2004 versus Spengler et al., 
2010 voor imitatie en Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004 versus Hadjikhani 
et al., 2014 voor empathie). Aangezien het huidige paradigma beide 
processen omvat, werd dit paradigma gebruikt om verdere inzichten te 
verwerven in deze discrepanties door na te gaan of en hoe de invloed van 
geïmiteerd worden op empathie voor pijn verschillend is voor HFA wanneer 
vergeleken werd met TO volwassenen. Er werd voor HFA een invloed van 
imitatie geobserveerd, maar deze invloed verschilde van diegene die 
geobserveerd werd voor TO. In het begin van het experiment vertoonden 
HFA lagere affectieve responsen na imitatie, terwijl op het einde hogere 
reacties werden geboserveed bij pijnperceptie. TO volwassenen repliceerden 
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telkens voorgaande effecten. Deze studie toonde aan dat volwassenen met 
HFA in staat zijn om empathische responsen te vertonen, maar dat imitatie 
een verschillende invloed heeft op dit empathisch functioneren in 
vergelijking met TO volwassnenen. De bevinding dat de invloed van 
geïmiteerd worden veranderd over de tijd werd geïnterpreteerd als evidentie 
voor een probleem in de controle van zelf-anderoverlap (Spengler et al., 
2010; zie ook Hamilton, 2013).  
 
IMPLICATIES VAN DE ONDERZOEKSRESULTATEN 
 
Met behulp van bovenstaande vier hoofdstukken waren we in staat 
overtuigende evidentie te bieden voor de idee dat geïmiteerd worden een 
invloed heeft op het observeren van anderen in pijn. Verder werd ook 
aangetoond dat zelf-anderoverlap onderliggend is aan dit effect. Het blijft 
echter onzeker of dergelijke zelf-anderverwarring ook optreedt in meer 
complexe sociale situaties. Het huidige paradigma vertoont belangrijke 
verschillen met meer ecologisch valide imitatiesituaties (geen delay tussen 
eigen en geobserveerde bewegingen, eenvoudige bewegingen, eerste persoon 
perspectief) zoals vaak gebruikt in sociaal-psychologisch onderzoek. 
Dergelijk onderzoek heeft immers aangetoond dat complexe prosociale 
gevolgen van imitatie enkel optreden indien subjecten zich niet bewust zijn 
van de imitatiesituatie (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al., 2004). 
Het is bijgevolg niet vanzelfsprekend dat ook in deze complexe sociale 
situaties dezelfde mechanismen optreden als in huidg paradigma. Het zou 
echte verbazend zijn indien ook hier niet een vorm van zelf-anderverwarring 
zou spelen.  
Een belangrijke vraag die hierbij wordt opgeroepen is de vraag of de 
term ‘empathie voor pijn’ correct is bij het beschrijven van huidige effecten. 
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Empathie wordt immers gedefinieerd als ‘de vaardigheid om affectieve 
ervaringenvan anderen te delen, waarbij ook een duidelijk onderscheid 
tussen zelf en ander aanwezig blijft’ (Singer & Lamm, 2009). Alle studies 
wezen op de idee dat zelf-anderverwarring de grenzen tussen zelf en ander 
vervaagde. In de eerste studie werd immers aangetoond dat RHI indices 
zoals agency, controle en lichaamseigenschap verhoogd waren in de 
imitatieconditie. Deze assumptie was dan ook de aanleiding voor de TMS 
studie, waarin getoond werd dat onze imitatiemanipulatie in staat was 
actietendensen te moduleren. Dit was opnieuw evidentie voor de idee dat 
imitatie een sterke invloed had op het zelf, aangezien een terugtrekrespons 
enkel zinvol is indien de grenzen tussen zelf en ander vervagen. Onze fMRI 
studie demonstreerde aanvullend dat de TPJ, een regio gelinkt aan zelf-
anderdistincite (Brass et al., 2001; Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2010) 
geactiveerd werd tijdens pijnperceptie na imitatie, wat wijst op een sterkere 
nood aan het onderscheiden tussen zelf en ander in deze situatie. Het blijft 
dus een open vraag of in huidig paradigma empathie onderzocht werd of 
eerder mechanismen gerelateerd aan agency, controle en de RHI. Echter, 
onze gedragsresultaten toonden aan dat proefpersonen nog altijd in staat 
waren de ander van het zelf te onderscheiden. Zelfrapportageratings waren 
verschillend voor zelf- en andergerelateerde items, met significant hogere 
scores op items gericht op gevoelens van de ander. We opteerden er 
bijgevolg voor om nog steeds de term empathie voor pijn te hanteren, met 
het besef dat deze term hoogstwaarschijnlijk niet alle processen omvat. Het 
is echter noodzakelijk om na te gaan of meer ecologisch valide 
imitatiesituaties gelijkaardige effecten vertonen en of zelf-anderverwarring 
ook hier optreedt.  
Tot slot moet hierbij worden opgemerkt dat de discrepantie tussen 
expliciete (zelfrapportage) en impliciete maten (psychofysiologie, TMS, 
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fMRI) in alle hoofdstukken erop zouden kunnen wijzen dat meerdere 
mechanismen meespelen. In geen van alle studies waren beide maten 
gecorreleerd, eventueel wijzend op de idee dat expliciete maten meer 
beïnvloed werden door een abstract empathieproces, terwijl impliciete maten 
gevoelig waren voor zelf-anderverwarring. Verschillende studies wezen 
reeds op een belangrijk onderscheid tussen cognitieve en emotionele 
empathie (Hynes, Baird, & Grafton, 2006; Schulte-Ruther, Markowitsch, 
Fink, & Piefke, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009; 
Vollm et al., 2006). De relatie tussen beide vormen blijft echter onduidelijk, 
waardoor ook de link tussen beide responsen in de huidige thesis verder 
onderzoek vraagt. Het zou bijvoorbeeld interessant zijn om na te gaan of 
expliciete maten generaliseren naar anderen niet initieel aanwezig in de 
sociale interactie (zie e.g. van Baaren et al., 2004), terwijl impliciete maten 
gefocused zijn op de interactiepartner met wie zelf-anderverwarring 
optreedt.  
Kortom boden we in huidige thesis met vier studies – 
gebruikmakend van vier verschillende methodologieën – evidentie voor de 
idee dat geïmiteerd worden reacties verhoogt bij het observeren van anderen 
in pijn. Er werd evidentie geboden voor de idee dat gedeelde representaties 
tussen zelf en ander onderliggend waren aan de effecten, waardoor werd 
aangetoond dat een basaal mechanisme instaat voor de interactie tussen het 
motorische systeem (imitatie) en sensorische systeem (pijnobservatie). 
Alhoewel de huidige setup te maken heeft met enkele erkende limitaties, 
geloven we niettemin dat de huidge thesis belangrijke inzichten verschaft in 
allerhande sociale (imitatieve) situaties en pijnobservatie, waarbij twee – 
voordien ongerelateerde – onderzoeksdomeinen met elkaar verbonden 
werden.  
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